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ABSTRACT
On March 27, 2019, India launched a direct ascent anti-satel-
lite (ASAT) weapon, aimed at the Indian Ministry of Defense
satellite Microsat-R. The kinetic-energy ASAT weapon collided
with Microsat-R at an altitude of nearly 300 kilometers, creating
an estimated 250 pieces of trackable debris from the 740-kilo-
gram satellite. With this effective demonstration of ASAT capa-
bility, India became only the fourth nation to successfully
intercept an orbiting satellite in the sixty-one years since the
U.S.S.R. placed into orbit the first artificial satellite, Sputnik.
While India’s demonstration purported to take deliberate steps
to mitigate some of the risk associated with a kinetic-energy
ASAT attack, it nonetheless carries significant implications for
the international community. Aside from balance of power and
regional stability questions, the demonstration is another re-
minder that space itself is a global commons, and the activities
of one state affect the use by every other participant. States must
reengage discussions of constraining kinetic-energy ASAT weap-
ons to ensure that unfettered pollution of debris does not pre-
vent future space exploration and commerce.
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This Article argues that the suggested international regimes
that might regulate the testing and use of kinetic-energy ASAT
weapons are both fragmented and ineffective. It begins with a
brief examination of outer space as a global commons, the dif-
ferent types of orbits employed by artificial satellites, and a his-
tory of the weapons used to intercept or counter them. This
Article then discusses applicable treaties and state practices rele-
vant to activities in outer space that form the foundation of the
relevant legal regimes. It analyzes the application and effective-
ness of proposed legal regimes for constraining ASAT weapon
usage including state liability for space debris, the acceptable
means and methods of warfare, and environmental modification
regimes. Finding that those regimes have not adequately con-
strained state use of kinetic-energy ASAT weapons, this Article
proposes that states should reengage in reciprocal arms control
regimes that would prohibit the testing and use of kinetic-en-
ergy ASAT weapons while preserving cyber, directed-energy, and
electromagnetic spectrum attacks against space-based assets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
ON MARCH 27, 2019, India launched a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon from Dr. Abdul Kalam Island,
targeting the Indian Ministry of Defense satellite Microsat-R.1
The kinetic-energy ASAT weapon collided with Microsat-R at an
altitude of nearly 300 kilometers, creating an estimated 250
pieces of trackable debris from the 740-kilogram satellite.2 With
1 Ashlyn Still et al., India Shoots Down Own Satellite, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://graphics.reuters.com/INDIA-SATELLITE-WEAPON/0100918Q1RV/in
dex.html [https://perma.cc/4ZMM-5R8A].
2 See Madhumathi D.S., ISRO’s First Mission of 2019 to Put Military Satellite
Microsat-R in Space, HINDU (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/
science/isros-first-mission-of-2019-to-put-military-satellite-microsat-r-in-space/arti
cle26072511.ece [https://perma.cc/59LB-BP4V]; Sanjeev Miglani & Krishna N.
Das, Modi Hails India as Military Space Power After Anti-Satellite Missile Test, REUTERS
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-satellite/modi-hails-
india-as-military-space-power-after-anti-satellite-missile-test-idUSKCN1R80IA
[https://perma.cc/55KJ-Q7TU].
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this effective demonstration of ASAT capability, India became
only the fourth nation to successfully intercept an orbiting satel-
lite in the sixty-one years since the U.S.S.R. placed into orbit the
first artificial satellite, Sputnik.3 While Prime Minister Modi
lauded the success of Operation Shakti in a nationally televised
address,4 India’s Ministry of External Affairs specifically stated
that India has no intention of entering into a space arms race,
and it repeated the proclamation of the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty that “[o]uter space is the common heritage of human-
kind.”5 The Ministry also stated that, while the test was not di-
rected at any specific country, India’s ASAT capability is a
credible deterrent against threats to India’s space-based assets.6
While India suggests the demonstration took deliberate actions
during the engagement to mitigate some of the risk associated
with a kinetic-energy ASAT attack, the strike nonetheless carries
significant implications for the international community.7
Aside from balance-of-power and regional stability questions,
the demonstration is another reminder that space itself is a
global commons, and the activities of one state affect its use by
every other participant.8 States must reengage discussions over
constraining kinetic energy ASAT weapons to ensure that unfet-
tered pollution of debris does not prevent space exploration
and commerce. Intentional breakups, such as kinetic-energy
ASAT testing, are responsible for thousands of pieces of debris
in low-Earth orbit (LEO).9 Depending on the altitude, it can
3 See Steve Garber, Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, NASA, https://his-
tory.nasa.gov/sputnik/ [https://perma.cc/MXH8-E8JV] (last updated Oct. 10,
2007); Still et al., supra note 1.
4 See Miglani & Das, supra note 2; Still et al., supra note 1.
5 Press Release, Ministry of External Affairs, Gov’t of India, Frequently Asked
Questions on Mission Shakti, India’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test Conducted on 27
March, 2019 (Mar. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions on Mis-
sion Shakti].
6 Id.
7 See infra section III.B.
8 See Eligar Sadeh, International Space Governance: Challenges for the Global Space
Community, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW 43, 45 (R. Venkata Rao et al.
eds., 2017).
9 Low-Earth orbit (LEO) is typically defined as an orbit with an altitude be-
tween 160 and 2,000 kilometers from the Earth’s surface. See Satellites 101: LEO vs.
GEO, IRIDIUM (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.iridium.com/blog/2018/09/11/
satellites-101-leo-vs-geo/ [https://perma.cc/E6Y3-9NF8]. Satellites in this orbit
travel at approximately 7.8 kilometers per second and circle the Earth every 90
minutes. See Types of Orbits, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, https://www.esa.int/Our_
Activities/Space_Transportation/Types_of_orbits [https://perma.cc/W4LL-
8GN5] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). This altitude is particularly suited for remote
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take anywhere from a few months to several decades before the
debris eventually degrades into the Earth’s atmosphere.10 Until
then, even pieces as small as several centimeters can pose signifi-
cant dangers to operational spacecraft in orbit.11 This problem
is exacerbated in mid-Earth orbit (MEO),12 where debris can
persist for centuries, and geostationary orbit, where debris re-
mains indefinitely.13
sensing operations, military intelligence gathering, and human spaceflight be-
cause the short orbital period allows for rapid, repeated overflight. See id. Addi-
tionally, the majority of commercial communications satellites are in LEO,
operating in a constellation to provide near-instantaneous global communica-
tions. See Satellites 101: LEO vs. GEO, supra. Polar orbits are a specific type of LEO
where satellites make continuous vertical passes over the Earth that, due to the
Earth’s natural rotation, allow the satellite to effectively map the entirety of the
planet twice in a 24-hour period. See Popular Orbits 101, AEROSPACE SECURITY,
https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/popular-orbits-101/ [https://perma.
cc/E3YA-FH82] (last updated Oct. 4, 2019).
10 See Frequently Asked Questions, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE, https:/
/www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faq/ [https://perma.cc/42A5-7H7X] (last vis-
ited Mar. 17, 2020).
11 See id.
12 Mid-Earth orbits (MEO) are typically defined as having an altitude greater
than 2,000 and less than 36,000 kilometers, with orbital periods that range from 2
to 24 hours. See Popular Orbits 101, supra note 9; Satellite Orbits, EMEA SATELLITE
OPERATORS ASS’N, https://esoa.net/technology/satellite-orbits.asp [https://
perma.cc/9YRV-4AQB] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). The primary occupants of
MEO orbits are navigation satellite constellations, such as the Global Positioning
System, GLONASS, and Galileo systems. See Satellite Orbits, supra. Because of the
orbital periods, communications satellites that provide coverage of the Earth’s
poles are placed in MEO as well. See id. One of the difficulties of placing satellites
into MEO is the presence of the Van Allen radiation belts, which are caused by
the Earth’s natural magnetic fields trapping charged particles from solar winds
and cosmic rays. See Popular Orbits 101, supra note 9. The two belts extend roughly
from 500 to 5,500 kilometers and 12,000 to 22,000 kilometers in altitude. Id. The
costly additional shielding required to protect solar arrays and electronic compo-
nents, combined with the increased transmission power requirements, preclude
smaller satellites from occupying these orbits. Cf. id. Highly elliptical orbits
(HEO) are a special form of MEO orbit that extends the elliptical orbit of the
satellite in an oblong manner, allowing for maximum coverage time of a particu-
lar hemisphere. See id. HEO orbits were of particular importance in the Cold
War, where the United States and the U.S.S.R. placed numerous reconnaissance
satellites in HEO Molniya orbits (an inclination of 63.4 degrees from the equator,
with an average apogee of 40,000 kilometers) to provide constant observation of
each other.
13 Geostationary orbits (GEO) have an altitude of 35,786 kilometers, giving
them an orbital period of exactly 24 hours. Popular Orbits 101, supra note 9. GEO
satellites appear to be in a fixed position to an observer on Earth, making them
ideal for communications purposes, since ground-based antennas can consist-
ently be aimed directly at the satellite. See T.S. Kelso, Basics of the Geostationary
Orbit, SATELLITE TIMES, May 1998, at 76, 76–77, https://www.celestrak.com/col-
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In an effort to constrain the creation of artificial debris, the
international community has tried with limited success to pro-
hibit the intentional destruction of satellites in orbit. Both the
Outer Space Treaty of 196714 and the Liability Convention of
197215 address responsibility and liability for damage caused by
debris from human spaceflight. While both treaties remain in
force, current systems are capable of tracking only a small frac-
tion of the debris population, thus making it difficult or impossi-
ble to identify the party at fault. Another suggestion has been
that the use of kinetic-energy ASAT weapons is a means of war-
fare that violates the principles of the law of armed conflict. Spe-
cifically, it is impossible to contain the debris produced, and the
debris can indiscriminately harm otherwise-protected state prop-
erty. This approach is also unsuccessful at constraining ASAT
use, since the proportionality balancing assessment prescribed
by the law of armed conflict would likely justify an attack that
crippled adversarial space assets when weighed against any po-
tential future harm resulting from an unintentional collision
with debris. A final approach contemplated is that the use of
kinetic-energy strikes in space causes widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the natural environment in violation of several
environmental protection regimes. This argument also fails to
prohibit kinetic strikes directed against a satellite, as the envi-
ronmental regimes either require use of the environment as a
weapon against an enemy or intent to damage the environment.
This Article argues that the applicable international regimes
are both fragmented and ineffective, and a better approach to
prohibit future kinetic-energy ASAT strikes is to reengage in
multilateral, reciprocal arms control agreements. These agree-
ments have previously been successful in ending the means and
methods of warfare identified by the international community as
umns/v04n07/ [https://perma.cc/54KJ-PKQ2] (last updated Dec. 28, 2019). Ge-
ostationary orbits with no inclination travel directly over the top of the Earth’s
equator and maintain a ground track directly over the same point. Id. Geosyn-
chronous orbits have a minute variation in altitude and a slight inclination above
or below the equator, which cause them to appear to travel in a figure-eight pat-
tern over a fixed point to a ground-based observer. Id.; Popular Orbits 101, supra
note 9.
14 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VII,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
15 See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects art. III, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liabil-
ity Convention]
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excessively injurious, damaging, or inhumane. China and Russia
have made progress in establishing a comprehensive ASAT arms
control regime; the United States should now take the lead in
negotiating such an agreement in order to protect its depen-
dence on space-based assets and retain its military and economic
supremacy. The United States’ failure to establish these agree-
ments will likely be taken as an acquiescence to recent state ac-
tion, which may cement a customary international law norm
that tolerates the use of kinetic-energy interceptors.
This Article begins with a brief examination of outer space as
a global commons, the different types of orbits employed by arti-
ficial satellites, and a history of the weapons used to intercept or
counter them. The Article then looks at applicable treaties and
state practices that form the foundation of governance in outer
space. It then analyzes the application and effectiveness of a
control regime based upon state liability for space debris and a
regime constrained by the acceptable means and methods of
warfare available to states. Finding that those regimes have not
adequately constrained state use of kinetic-energy ASAT weap-
ons, this Article proposes that states should pursue reciprocal
arms control regimes that would prohibit the testing and use of
kinetic-energy ASAT weapons while preserving cyber, directed-
energy, and electromagnetic spectrum attacks against space-
based assets.
II. THE ASAT THREAT TO THE GLOBAL COMMONS
A. WHAT ARE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS?
ASAT weapons are any intentional physical object or electro-
magnetic force directed against the normal functioning of a
space-based asset.16 Traditional ASAT weapons are direct-ascent
ballistic missiles launched on an intercept trajectory; the kinetic
energy from the collision causes damage ranging from fragmen-
tation to outright obliteration, depending on the mass of the
objects and their relative speed at the time of impact.17 Other
kinetic-energy weapons include co-orbital ASAT weapons that
establish an orbit, transition to the target orbit, and either col-
16 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JP 3-14, SPACE OPERATIONS I-6
(Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter JP 3-14, SPACE OPERATIONS].
17 Cf. id.
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lide with or detonate in close proximity to the target, destroying
it with the resulting fragmentation.18
Satellites are equally vulnerable to non-kinetic attacks. Inten-
tional attacks manipulating the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum
can interfere with the link between the satellite and the ground
control station or can be directed against the satellite itself.19
These attacks include radiation and reflection jamming of the
space or link segment or the direct lasing of a satellite to “blind”
or destroy it.20 Finally, the ground control station is vulnerable
to an attack through cyberspace, degrading or destroying the
satellite.21
B. WHY ARE COUNTRIES INTENT ON DEVELOPING ASAT
TECHNOLOGIES?
States’ economic and military activities are increasingly reliant
on access to space and the use of space-based assets. Satellites
map natural resources through remote sensing, provide up-
dated imagery in the wake of natural disasters, and ensure com-
pliance with international regimes through monitoring of
weapons production facilities.22 Satellites also provide global
communication capabilities, real-time weather mapping, and
navigation guidance for transiting vessels.23 For example, it is
estimated that, in 2011, between 6%–7% of western European
gross domestic product was reliant on the use of the Global Posi-
18 See id. at II-15. Russia chose to pursue a co-orbital ASAT system rather than
the nuclear-tipped interceptors employed by the United States. The Russian pro-
gram, codenamed Istrebitel Sputnikov (Satellite Fighter), was operational from
1968–1982 and consisted of at least twenty tests in LEO. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
AERONAUTICAL & SPACE SCIENCES, 94TH CONG., 1 SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS,
1971–75: OVERVIEW, FACILITIES AND HARDWARE, MANNED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT
PROGRAMS, BIOASTRONAUTICS, CIVIL AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS, PROJECTIONS OF
FUTURE PLANS 66–67, 424–26 (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in 3 HISTORIES OF THE
SOVIET/RUSSIAN SPACE PROGRAM: SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971–1975, at 60–61,
353–54 (Progressive Management 2013); see also Todd Harrison et al., Space
Threat Assessment 2018, at 13–14, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (2018),
https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Harrison_Space
ThreatAssessment_FULL_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CHB-UNCA].
19 See JP 3-14, SPACE OPERATIONS, supra note 16, at I-6.
20 See id.
21 See id. at I-7.
22 See What Are Satellites Used For?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://
www.ucsusa.org/resources/what-are-satellites-used [https://perma.cc/MW7R-
D5TC] (last updated Jan. 15, 2015).
23 See id.
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tioning System (GPS) constellation of satellites.24 Military com-
munications satellites, spy satellites, and GPS satellites are
indispensable tools of modern conflict; they detect missile
launches, guide precision weapons, and facilitate near-instanta-
neous communications among all levels of military command.25
Countries with a robust space presence seek credible deter-
rents to protect their access to the space domain and their ex-
isting assets. The 2006 National Space Policy provided that the
United States would view any “purposeful interference with its
space systems as an infringement on its rights.”26 Coupled with a
threat to deny adversaries the use of capabilities that infringe on
U.S. freedom of action in outer space, the international commu-
nity has approached the declaration as evidence of unilateralist
intentions for space.27 The United States updated the language
of its space policy in 2010, though deterrence remains a com-
mon theme to ensure freedom of action.28
Freedom of action in space, as defined by Joint Publication 3-
14: Space Operations (United States) and Joint Doctrine Publication
0-30: UK Air and Space Power (United Kingdom), is derived from
the ability to control access to and movement in space.29 Both
the United States and the United Kingdom state that protection
of space assets will rely on credible deterrence where the “cost”
24 Dale Stephens, Increasing Militarization of Space and Normative Responses, in
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW, supra note 8, at 91, 101.
25 See JP 3-14, SPACE OPERATIONS, supra note 16, at II-4 to II-6, II-11.
26 OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, U.S. NA-
TIONAL SPACE POLICY 1 (2006). The fifth principle states,
The United States considers space capabilities—including the
ground and space segments and supporting links—vital to its na-
tional interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will:
preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dis-
suade or deter others from either impeding those rights or devel-
oping capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to
protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if
necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S.
national interests.
Id. at 1–2.
27 Bao Shixiu, Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space, CHINA SECURITY, Winter 2007, at
2, 2–4 (taking the position that space is a limited resource and that the U.S.
declaration is an attempt to establish sovereignty over the resource).
28 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 3 (2010) (describing the need to “defend our space systems
and . . . if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.”).
29 See UK MINISTRY OF DEF., JDP 0-30, UK AIR AND SPACE POWER 95 (2d ed. Dec.
2017) [hereinafter JDP 0-30, UK AIR AND SPACE POWER]; JP 3-14, SPACE OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 16, at II-2.
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of adversary action outweighs any perceived “benefits.”30 Con-
trol of space is professed as the new high ground for military
operations, enabling control over the battlefield below.31 China
is also committed to protection of its space-based assets through
a credible ASAT deterrent.32 Russia, which first conducted ASAT
tests in the 1960s, continues to develop various ASAT systems to
protect its assets.33
C. WHY IS SPACE DEBRIS RESULTING FROM ASAT ATTACKS A
CONCERN?
Because outer space is a global commons beyond the sover-
eign jurisdiction of states, a collective action problem exists in
the assignment and utilization of viable orbits around the
Earth.34 As long as a state possesses the technological means to
achieve orbit (or the capital to pay for enabling launch services),
that state can enjoy free use and equal access to orbits. In the
absence of international regimes to govern use, a tragedy of the
commons results from states acting in self-interest, with no re-
gard for the proliferation of orbiting debris or pollution of ce-
lestial bodies, absent the threat that continued creation of
debris poses to the state’s own interests.35 If states believe that
proposed regulations on use and access will benefit direct com-
petitors also seeking to exploit the space commons, collective
action to regulate state behavior is further impeded.36 This phe-
nomenon is apparent in previous iterations of the National
Space Policy and comparative deterrence policies espoused by
the current spacefaring nations, placing freedom of action in
space and protection of space-based assets as vital to their na-
tional interests, arguably at the expense of free use and access to
the space commons.
30 JDP 0-30, UK AIR AND SPACE POWER, supra note 29, at 112; JP 3-14, SPACE
OPERATIONS, supra note 16, at I-9.
31 See Stephens, supra note 24, at 93. General Lance Lord, Commander of the
Air Force Space Command, noted, “Space superiority is the future of warfare. We
cannot win a war without controlling the high ground, and the high ground is
space.” Id.
32 Bao, supra note 27, at 9.
33 See Sean O’Connor, Russia’s ASAT Development Takes Aim at LEO Assets, JANE’S
(2008), https://www.janes.com/images/assets/591/81591/Russias_
ASAT_development_takes_aim_at_LEO_assets.pdf [https://perma.cc/NEA3-
FFR3] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
34 See Sadeh, supra note 8, at 45.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 49.
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For the nations currently capable of launching payloads into
orbit, freedom of action in space has translated to placing as
many spacecraft into orbit as possible in order to secure foot-
holds on limited orbital space.37 In the past decade alone, the
number of states operating satellites in orbit has doubled to over
50, while over 100 nations actively use space systems and ser-
vices.38 The annual launch rate of spacecraft more than doubled
in previous years, increasing from 129 launches in 2010 to 262
in 2015.39 A major factor for this increase is the trend in launch-
ing into orbit micro- and nanosatellite constellations, which pro-
vide regional or global network capability from linked satellites
that weigh less than 10 kilograms each.40 While the vast majority
of the small satellite constellations operate in LEO, it is the GEO
region that contains the majority of satellite mass, at nearly 40%
of the total satellites in orbit.41
GEO orbits are arguably a limited natural resource, facing
similar allocation and conservation problems as other depleting
global resources.42 Due to the altitude of the orbit, only a lim-
ited degree of inclination is available to maintain a geostation-
ary orbit, significantly limiting the number of objects that can be
within the GEO band at any given time.43 Currently, there is no
international allocation system for any orbit, which further con-
tributes to the tragedy of the commons problem. The conges-
tion created by the limited inclination is not the only problem
with the altitude of GEO orbits—debris trapped in GEO is rela-
tively permanent, since it generally does not degrade into the
atmosphere.44 Destruction of GEO satellites and the resulting
debris cloud would have a disproportionate impact compared to
a breakup in low-, mid-, or high-Earth orbit because of the lim-
37 States that currently have the capability to launch a payload into orbit are:
the United States, Russia, France (which also launches for the European Space
Agency), China, Japan, India, Israel, Ukraine, Iran, North Korea, and South Ko-
rea. See The Global Nature of Space Activities, SECURE WORLD FOUND., https://
swfound.org/space-sustainability-101/the-global-nature-of-space-activities/
[https://perma.cc/HG6N-CEAC] (last updated Feb. 6, 2015).
38 Id.; see also K.R. Sridhara Murthi & V. Gopalakrishnan, Trends in Outer Space
Activities—Legal and Policy Challenges, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW,
supra note 8, at 27, 30–31.
39 Murthi & Gopalakrishnan, supra note 38, at 31.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Michel Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, Jus in Bello Spatiale, 25 AIR & SPACE
L. 2, 10 (2000).
43 See Kelso, Basics of the Geostationary Orbit, supra note 13.
44 See Sadeh, supra note 8, at 47.
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ited number of viable GEO orbits. Since eleven countries con-
trol access to the space commons,45 the allocation and
utilization of GEO orbits presents a situation ripe for future con-
flict, such as the previous attempt by eight equatorial states to
assert sovereignty over geostationary orbits through the Bogotá
Declaration.46 Along with the limited inclination available for
45 The United States, France (European Space Agency), Russia, China, Japan,
India, and Ukraine are the only countries with confirmed lift capability to geosyn-
chronous or geostationary transfer orbits, even at small-lift weights (less than
2,000 kilograms). See The Global Nature of Space Activities, supra note 37. Ukraine
manufactures the Dnepr rockets for access to geo-transfer orbits, though it has no
current indigenous launch facilities aside from the non-operational Sea Launch
Odyssey floating platform. See, e.g., DNEPR User’s Guide, KOSMOTRAS (Nov. 2001),
https://snebulos.mit.edu/projects/reference/launch_vehicles/DNEPR/Dnepr_
User_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG4K-DACL]; Sea Launch Celebrates 20th Anni-
versary, YUZHNOYE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.yuzhnoye.com/en/press-center/
news/copy_news_516.html [https://perma.cc/MA97-M897]; Space Systems Fore-
cast: Dnepr, FORECAST INT’L (Aug. 2017), https://www.forecastinternational.com/
archive/disp_pdf.cfm?DACH_RECNO=1287 [https://perma.cc/9UYJ-N6RA].
For information about each country’s capabilities, see generally About H3 Launch
Vehicle, JAPAN AEROSPACE EXPL. AGENCY, https://global.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/
h3/ [https://perma.cc/33KV-8PWT] (last visited Mar. 19, 2020) (Japan’s capa-
bilities); Angara Launch Vehicles Family, KHRUNICHEV STATE RESEARCH & PROD.
SPACE CTR., http://www.khrunichev.ru/main.php?id=44&lang=EN [https://
perma.cc/TVA3-95D3] (last visited Mar. 19, 2020) (Russia’s capabilities); Rui C.
Barbosa, China Conducts Long March 5 Maiden Launch, NASA SPACEFLIGHT (Nov. 2,
2016), https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2016/11/china-long-march-5-maiden-
launch/ [https://perma.cc/Y9QM-6JS8] (China’s capabilities); Paul K. McCon-
naughey et al., Draft Launch Propulsion Systems Roadmap, at TA01-2, NASA (2010),
https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/500393main_TA01-LaunchPropulsion-DRAFT-Nov
2010-A.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFS5-F8A3] (U.S. capabilities); Polar Satellite
Launch Vehicle, INDIAN SPACE RESEARCH ORG., https://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/
pslv [https://perma.cc/UL6L-YZGK] (last visited Mar. 19, 2020) (India’s
capabilities).
46 See Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Minutes of the First Plenary Meeting,
Broadcasting Satellite Conference, annex 4, at 16–17, ITU Doc. No. 81-E (Jan.
17, 1977). The Bogotá Declaration of 1976 was an attempt by eight countries to
assert sovereign control over the portions of GEO orbits that extend above their
state borders. The Declaration argued that GEO orbits are a natural resource
subject to the sovereign control of the state under the Charter on Economic
Rights and Duties of States, and that the definition of “outer space” contained
within the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 does not explicitly include GEO orbits as
part of “outer space.” Id. at 18–19. The Declaration has received little interna-
tional support, since the Outer Space Treaty makes clear that no part of space is
subject to national appropriation. The original signatories of the Declaration are
Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire. Haris
A. Durrani, The Bogotá Declaration: A Global Uprising?, COLUM. U.: UPRISING 13/
13/ BLOG (Jan. 21, 2018), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/uprising1313/haris-a-
durrani-the-bogota-declaration-a-global-uprising/ [https://perma.cc/B9D6-
6HEP].
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GEO orbits, the finite nature of EM-spectrum utilization in
space is also a constrained resource prone to conflict, though
likely to a lesser extent because of the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization’s (ITSO) role in frequency
allocation.47
Kinetic-energy attacks against space-based assets pose a special
threat to the international community because of the residual
debris that results from collisions. While directed-energy laser
attacks and EM jamming can temporarily incapacitate or perma-
nently destroy satellites,48 kinetic breakups typically produce a
debris field relative to the mass and velocity involved in the colli-
sion.49 Debris trapped in LEO can persist for decades, depend-
ing on the orbit of the original object, and debris from a
collision in GEO can remain indefinitely.50 As the amount of
debris trapped in orbit increases, the likelihood of an accidental
collision increases as well. The United Nations (U.N.) Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has pub-
lished debris mitigation guidelines that specifically address
intentional breakups, though the guidelines are nonbinding
best practices to avoid unnecessary pollution of outer space.51
Based on current projections of debris in LEO, an accidental
collision is expected to occur every five to nine years.52 Colli-
sions, whether intentional or accidental, and the resulting deb-
ris will continuously increase the risks to all assets in orbit. As
the amount of debris and operational space assets in orbit in-
creases, so too does the risk of the phenomenon known as the
Kessler Syndrome. The Kessler Syndrome posits that a chain re-
47 Frequency allocation is managed by the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization (ITSO) and the associated private company Intelsat, S.A.
INT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ORG. [ITSO], About Us, https://itso.int/
about-us/more/ [https://perma.cc/WZ4L-PKMA] (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
The United States issues licenses for the C- and Ku- bands, while the United King-
dom manages the Ka- band. Id.
48 JP 3-14, SPACE OPERATIONS, supra note 16, at I-6.
49 Meghan R. Plantz, Note, Orbital Debris: Out of Space, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 585, 595 (2012).
50 See PETER STUBBE, STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SPACE DEBRIS 32 (2018).
51 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of Sci & Tech. Sub-
comm. on Its Fifty-Third Session, Progress Report of the Working Group on
Space Debris, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.284, at 4 (2006) [hereinafter Progress
Report of the Working Group on Space Debris].
52 Space Situational Awareness: Examining Key Issues and the Changing Landscape:
Hearing of the H. Subcomm. on Space & Aeronautics of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech.,
116th Cong. 5 & n.13 (2020) (statement of Brian Weeden, Director of Program
Planning, Secure World Foundation).
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action of orbital breakups may occur from debris colliding with
either space assets or other debris, potentially causing a cascad-
ing effect and significantly reducing the number of viable
orbits.53
Tracking current orbital debris to avoid unintentional colli-
sions has become a major concern for states and institutions op-
erating space assets. Currently, only the United States and
Russia have comprehensive space debris tracking systems at
their disposal.54 The Space Surveillance Network (SSN), oper-
ated by the Joint Space Operations Center, is considered the
most capable system, with the ability to catalogue objects 10 cen-
timeters and larger in LEO and 1 meter and larger in GEO.55
Like the SSN, Russia’s Space Surveillance System (SSS) uses a
combination of phased-array radars and electro-optical
telescopes to track objects; however, the SSS maintains a smaller
catalogue of objects than the SSN.56 Private companies such as
LeoLabs have begun developing commercial space tracking sys-
tems, with the goal of increasing detection resolution to 2 centi-
meters.57 Other countries also have various specialized sensors
with particular missions to aid in providing a complete assess-
ment of the debris orbiting the planet.58 Additionally, Russia ap-
pears to be developing both ground- and air-based laser systems
with a focus on ASAT missions.59
The first recorded natural collision between objects in orbit
occurred in 1991, when the Russian satellite Cosmos 1934 was
struck by a piece of debris from Cosmos 926, producing minimal
debris but highlighting the dangers presented by orbiting wreck-
53 Plantz, supra note 49, at 596–97.
54 See STUBBE, supra note 50, at 44.
55 Id. at 44–45.
56 Id. at 45; BRIAN WEEDEN ET AL., GLOBAL SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SEN-
SORS 5 (2010), https://swfound.org/media/15274/global%20ssa%20sensors-
amos-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/96JJ-MYWG].
57 Telephone Interview with Dan Ceperly, Chief Exec. Officer, LeoLabs (Sept.
5, 2018).
58 STUBBE, supra note 50, at 45. France operates both GRAVES radar and the
TAROT telescopes. GRAVES performs catalogue maintenance for LEO debris,
while TAROT telescopes are aimed at the GEO belt. Id. The German TIRA radar
system is used for collision avoidance and tracking spacecraft reentering the at-
mosphere. Id. The ESA operates a 1.5-meter resolution telescope located at the
Teide Observatory in the Canary Islands. See Teide Observatory, INSTITUTO DE AS-
TROFÍSICA DE CANARIAS, https://www.iac.es/en/observatorios-de-canarias/teide-
observatory [https://perma.cc/YE45-KVG3] (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
59 See O’Connor, supra note 33.
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age.60 Three other such collisions have occurred. In 1996, an
operational Cerise satellite collided with a residual fragment
from an exploded upper-stage Ariane rocket.61 In 2005, a Chi-
nese launch vehicle hit a U.S. rocket segment.62 The most nota-
ble collision occurred in 2009, when the operational Iridium 33
communications satellite collided with Cosmos 2251, with cata-
strophic results.63 The collision completely destroyed both
spacecraft, producing 1,875 pieces of debris larger than 10
centimeters.64
The dangers posed by inadvertent collisions substantially in-
crease when factoring in ASAT attacks. Several intentional
breakups have occurred in recent decades, significantly contrib-
uting to the debris population in orbit. In 1985, the United
States tested an air-launched missile aimed at the P78-1 Solwind
satellite, successfully destroying it in orbit.65 In 2008, the Na-
tional Reconnaissance Office lost control of satellite USA-193,
and fearing the uncontrolled reentry of the toxic hydrazine fuel
tanks on board, used an SM-3 missile launched from the USS
Lake Erie to destroy the satellite as it entered the atmosphere.66
The most significant debris-producing event occurred in 2007,
when China launched a direct-ascent ASAT missile at a defunct
weather satellite in polar LEO, the Feng Yun-1C (FY-1C).67 The
resulting collision produced an estimated 35,000 pieces of indi-
60 See Space Smash: Simulating When Satellites Collide, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY




62 STUBBE, supra note 50, at 18.
63 Id.; see also Space Smash: Simulating When Satellites Collide, supra note 60.
64 See Brian Weeden, 2009 Iridium-Cosmos Collision Fact Sheet, SECURE WORLD
FOUND., https://swfound.org/media/6575/swf_iridium_cosmos_collision_fact_
sheet_updated_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BJW-WD7D] (last updated Nov. 10,
2010).
65 See Lt. Col. James Mackey, Recent US and Chinese Antisatellite Activities, AIR &
SPACE POWER J., Fall 2009, at 82, 84.
66 Id. at 87. While the main concern of USA-193’s reentry was the hydrazine
fuel tanks onboard, other satellites carry much more dangerous power sources,
including nuclear reactors. In 1978, the nuclear-powered Cosmos 954 experienced
an uncontrolled reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere. See STUBBE, supra note 50,
at 40. The satellite partially broke apart upon reentry, scattering radioactive deb-
ris across an 800-kilometer by 50-kilometer swath of northern Canadian wilder-
ness. Id.
67 T.S. KELSO, ANALYSIS OF THE 2007 CHINESE ASAT TEST AND THE IMPACT OF
ITS DEBRIS ON THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT 321 (2007), http://amostech.com/Tech-
nicalPapers/2007/Orbital_Debris/Kelso.pdf [https://perma.cc/5USE-8L6Q].
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vidual debris 1 centimeter and larger, including 2,087 pieces
catalogued by the SSN (a 20% increase in catalogue size), and it
forced the Terra environmental spacecraft to alter its orbit.68 In
total, the resulting debris placed 700 spacecraft in LEO at a
heightened risk of unintentional collision, and an estimated
85% of the debris will likely remain in orbit for 100 years or
more.69
III. ASAT WEAPONS IN THE CORPUS JURIS SPATIALIS
AND STATE PRACTICE
The majority of law governing space is contained in the five
U.N. treaties and the five U.N. General Assembly resolutions
adopted as principles of space exploration and utilization.70 Va-
rious other regional and bilateral agreements add to the body of
law, albeit with somewhat limited recognition as governing
norms. Recently, there has been a distinct shift in state ap-
proach to regulating activities in space. In the twenty-two years
following the creation of COPUOS in 1958, five international
treaties were negotiated and concluded through the U.N.71
Since 1980, states have relied on nonbinding principles and
68 See id. at 325; see also Mackey, supra note 65, at 85; Gene V. Milowicki & Joan
Johnson-Freese, Strategic Choices: Examining the United States Military Response to the
Chinese Anti-Satellite Test, 6 ASTROPOLITICS 1, 3–4 (2008).
69 Milowicki & Johnson-Freese, supra note 68, at 3. The Terra craft was boosted
1.3 kilometers in altitude a week after the destruction of FY-1C to avoid a 40-
centimeter piece of debris. Id.
70 The five U.N. treaties are: the Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14; the Agree-
ment on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S.
119; the Liability Convention, supra note 15; Convention on Registration of Ob-
jects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15;
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. The five
U.N. resolutions are: G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Dec.
13, 1963) [hereinafter Declaration of Legal Principles]; G.A. Res. 37/92, Princi-
ples Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International
Direct Television Broadcasting (Dec. 10, 1982); G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relat-
ing to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (Dec. 3, 1986); G.A. Res.
47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space
(Dec. 14, 1992); G.A. Res. 51/122, Declaration on International Cooperation in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All
States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (Dec.
13, 1996).
71 Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and Nonbind-
ing Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289,
291–93 (2012).
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agreements, rather than broad, multiparty treaties, to regulate
activities.72 Further, for the purposes of ASAT regulation,
U.S.–U.S.S.R. bilateral agreements negotiated during the Cold
War have had a disproportionate effect on the development and
utilization of ASAT weapons because of the near indist-
inguishability between ASAT and ballistic missile defense
systems.73
Notwithstanding five decades of treaty negotiations, the cur-
rent body of space law anchored by the Outer Space Treaty is
insufficient to constrain intentional breakups in outer space, de-
spite the danger this activity poses to other states through the
creation of debris. The 1972 Liability Convention expands upon
the Outer Space Treaty’s liability provisions; its application to
ASAT weapons is limited in scope to testing outside of an armed
conflict.74 Since current technology can only track orbiting ob-
jects 10 centimeters or larger, claims under the Liability Con-
vention also face potential attribution issues depending on the
size of debris created. Environmental protection regimes found
in Additional Protocol I (AP I), the Environmental Modification
Convention, and the Rome Statute specifically prohibit wide-
spread, long-term, and severe modification to the natural envi-
ronment, but they are unlikely to overcome the mens rea,
proportionality, and distinction element analyses when imput-
ing liability to a military commander. Finally, agreements de-
signed to limit ASAT use presented to the Conference on
Disarmament have stalled due to definitional problems and in-
72 Id. at. 289–90. A notable wrinkle in this trend is the Declaration of Legal
Principles, which was adopted as G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII). However, this assertion
can be reconciled since the Declaration of Legal Principles became the frame-
work for the Outer Space Treaty adopted in 1967. See Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C
and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal Obligations Under Article IX of the
Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321, 328, 331 (2008).
73 Ballistic missile defenses (BMD) were heavily regulated during the Cold War
as part of the efforts to maintain the status quo of Mutually Assured Destruction.
See Joan Johnson-Freese, The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Policy: Moving To-
ward Space Control, in 30 OCCASIONAL PAPER 1, 4 (U.S. Air Force Inst. for Nat’l Sec.
Studies., 2000), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=487481 [https://perma.cc/
7D6W-F566]. The United States and Russia wanted to ensure that BMD networks
did not give the adversary an advantage when choosing to initiate a first strike,
since an effective BMD network would theoretically degrade any retaliatory strike
launched. Id. at 11. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prescribed the num-
ber and placement of BMD networks. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballis-
tic Missile Systems, U.S.–U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty]. The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in
2002.
74 See infra section IV.B.
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compatible state objectives with regard to space-based asset
protection.75
A. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 1967
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 marks the initial ef-
forts to establish binding norms for the exploration and use of
outer space.76 The OST has been called a “constitution for outer
space,” and it places several restrictions and positive obligations
upon states conducting activities in outer space.77 Article III re-
quires that state parties carry out activities in space “in accor-
dance with international law, including the Charter of the
United Nations.”78 Significant debate has occurred about the in-
teractions between juris spatialis and international law, though it
is generally accepted that space law is lex specialis in cases of spe-
cific regulation, with general international law complementing
areas with deficient regulation.79 Article IV prohibits the place-
ment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion in orbit or on celestial bodies.80 Article IV further prohibits
the installation of military facilities, testing of weapons, or con-
75 The Moon Agreement of 1979 entered into force in July of 1984. See Comm.
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Fifty-
Eighth Session, Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer
Space as at 1 January 2019, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2019/CRP.3 (Apr. 1,
2019). Currently, only eighteen states have ratified the treaty, and none of them
are significant contributors to space lift capability (with the exception of Kazakh-
stan, where the former U.S.S.R. cosmodrome Baikonur is located. Baikonur re-
mains leased to the Russian Federation). See id. at 10; DNEPR User’s Guide, supra
note 45, at 12.
76 Prior to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water entered into
force in 1963. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
The treaty is relevant to ASAT conversations, since the initial ASAT systems were
nuclear-tipped interceptors. Nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) remain the crudest yet arguably most effective ASAT weapon and are
accessible to a larger number of states than direct-ascent kinetic weapons. See
Clayton K.S. Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”: Program 437, the US Nuclear ASAT System
and Present-Day Copycat Killers, AIR UNIVERSITY 37–38 (2000).
77 See Wessel, supra note 71, at 292.
78 Outer Space Treaty supra note 14, art. III.
79 Pierfrancesco Breccia, Article III of Outer Space Treaty and Its Relevance in the
International Space Legal Framework, at 4, IAC Doc. No. IAC-16.E7.1.2, INT’L ASTRO-
NAUTICAL CONGRESS (2016), http://iislweb.org/docs/Diederiks2016.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/74MM-MBTM]; see also Sadeh, supra note 8, at 45–46 (arguing that
the OST is a limited legal framework that falls short of fully addressing all collec-
tive action problems in space).
80 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. IV.
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duct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies.81 Combining
these provisions, the OST would not prohibit the placement of
conventional weapons in orbit, so long as they did not meet the
definition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).82 The U.S.
Strategic Defense Initiative’s Star Wars program is a direct reflec-
tion of this position,83 and Chinese negotiating positions consist-
ently agree with this interpretation.84
Article VI of the OST establishes state responsibility for both
governmental and nongovernmental activities conducted in
outer space.85 Article VII further establishes international liabil-
ity for damage to another state caused by the launching state
and the state whose territory or facility was used to launch the
object, if applicable.86
Article IX is perhaps the most important provision contained
in the OST with respect to ASAT controls, placing several posi-
tive obligations on states conducting activities in outer space.87
Michael Mineiro identifies four positive obligations stemming
from the Article IX language: (1) a “principle of due regard” to
the corresponding interests of all other state parties; (2) an “ob-
ligation to avoid harmful contamination” of outer space; (3) an
“obligation to avoid adverse changes” in the Earth’s environ-
ment; and (4) an obligation “to undertake international consul-
tations” when a state believes an activity may cause harmful
81 Id.
82 If a state were to consider placing conventional weapons in orbit, such as in
a space-asset defense role, it would need to consider relevant definitions of a
weapon of mass destruction. The U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
recognizes three classes of WMDs: nuclear, chemical, and biological. See S.C. Res.
1540, at 1 (Apr. 28, 2004). Directed-energy and EM weapons do not fall in one of
the three UNODA weapon classes but could theoretically cause similar effects.
Hypervelocity Rod Bundles are also conventional weapons that could produce
destruction on the scale of recognized WMDs. Cf. Milowicki & Johnson-Freese,
supra note 68, at 7. For analysis concluding that the OST authorizes military activ-
ities in the void between celestial bodies, including Earth’s orbit, see Steven A.
Mirmina, The Ballistic Missile Defense System and Its Effects on the Outer Space Environ-
ment, 31 J. SPACE L. 287, 296–98 (2005).
83 See Johnson-Freese, supra note 73, at 8–10.
84 See Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Na-
tions Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, Ex-
isting International Legal Instruments and Prevention of the Weaponization of
Outer Space (Aug. 26, 2004), http://www.china-un.ch/eng/cjjk/cjjblc/cjlc/
t154641.htm [https://perma.cc/S7PE-UP3V].
85 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. VI.
86 Id. art. VII. The damage can be the result of the object or its components,
and it can occur on the Earth, in the air, or in outer space. See id.
87 See id. art. IX.
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interference.88 ASAT operations that create debris are arguably
contrary to the provisions contained in Article IX, since the re-
sulting debris is undeniably harmful contamination when it
places other spacecraft at risk. However, the duty is to avoid
harmful contamination rather than to outright ban any contam-
ination.89 The treaty lacks a definition of contamination and
metrics to evaluate whether states are avoiding contamination in
a manner that comports with good faith adherence to treaty ob-
ligations.90 Additionally, current state practice is, at worst, am-
bivalent to continued ASAT operations, considering the mixed
response from states following recent weapons tests and the de-
struction of USA-193.91 Article IX of the OST places an obliga-
tion on the launching state to notify other parties whose space
assets may be threatened if the experiment or activity planned
would cause potential interference.92 Arguably, given the results
of several ASAT weapons tests in recent decades, states should
be aware that a kinetic-energy weapon directed against a satellite
is likely to produce large amounts of debris, and therefore it
must notify other states whose assets may be affected.93 The issue
may then become whether the state purports to have taken all
reasonable precautions against unnecessary risk to other space
assets so as to not trigger the international consultations re-
quirements of Article IX.94
Two caveats to the consultation provision significantly under-
cut an argument that Article IX continues to impose broad re-
strictions on ASAT operations. First, Article IX obligations (and
Article VII liability concerns) are subject to the other bodies of
international law set forth in Article III, likely resulting in Article
IX obligations being preempted by the law of armed conflict or
88 See Mineiro, supra note 72, at 332–33, 339, 340–41 (arguing that due regard
to the corresponding interests of states is the prime obligation, with the other
three obligations acting as benchmarks for how states’ interests are to be
protected).
89 See id. at 340.
90 Id. at 339–40.
91 See David A. Kaplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regu-
lation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1237–38 (2009).
92 See Outer Space Treaty supra note 14, art. IX.
93 See Mineiro, supra note 72, at 354.
94 Cf. Mackey, supra note 65, at 88–89. The engagement of USA-193 was pur-
posefully delayed until the satellite was at an altitude that minimized both initial
and residual debris. Id. at 88. The statement from India’s Ministry of External
Affairs states that India’s test was also conducted “in the lower atmosphere to
ensure that there is no space debris.” See also Frequently Asked Questions on
Mission Shakti, supra note 5.
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the U.N. Security Council during a lawful engagement.95 Sec-
ond, the destruction of FY-1C was the only ASAT engagement
that drew significant international condemnation for disregard-
ing the provisions of Article IX.96 Seven countries and the Euro-
pean Union joined the United States in protesting China’s
actions and called for consultations as provided by Article IX.97
During the multiple decades that the United States and U.S.S.R.
conducted ASAT tests during the Cold War, neither state under-
took consultations prior to any activity, arguably creating recog-
nized state practice under Article 31(3)(B) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) that now negates
any possible obligation under Article IX when conducting an
ASAT test.98 This conclusion seems to be supported by India’s
actions relative to Microsat-R; India issued a public declaration
acknowledging the ASAT weapons test after the conclusion of
the engagement, but no consultations occurred prior to
launch.99
B. THE LIABILITY CONVENTION OF 1972
While the OST addresses liability in Article VII, the provision
contains little substance about how a claim would be submitted
95 See Michel Bourbonniere, National-Security Law in Outer Space: The Interface of
Exploration and Security, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 7–14 (2005); Mineiro, supra note
72, at 334–35, 344 n.38.
96 See Mike Gruss, U.S. Official: China Turned to Debris-Free ASAT Tests Following
2007 Outcry, SPACENEWS (Jan. 11, 2016), https://spacenews.com/u-s-official-
china-turned-to-debris-free-asat-tests-following-2007-outcry/ [https://perma.cc/
HPL2-5C5U]. Pakistan’s Foreign Office issued a statement condemning the In-
dian Microsat-R engagement, asserting that the test jeopardized the peaceful use
of outer space. See Miglani & Das, supra note 2.
97 Mineiro, supra note 72, at 346–47.
98 See id. at 345–46.
99 India did issue a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) prior to the launch of the
missile from Dr. Abdul Kalam Island, in accordance with International Civil Avia-
tion Organization requirements. See Ankit Panda, India Conducted a Failed Anti-
Satellite Test in February 2019, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 30, 2019), https://thediplo
mat.com/2019/04/exclusive-india-conducted-a-failed-anti-satellite-test-in-febru
ary-2019/ [https://perma.cc/GC32-JHDZ]. The NOTAM established a restricted
danger zone encompassing the area of the Indian Ocean where debris was pro-
jected to reenter the atmosphere. Id. The NOTAM did not specify that the missile
was an ASAT weapon or provide any other information as to the associated dan-
ger. Id. The NOTAM classified the event, using common terminology, as an “ex-
perimental flight trail.” Daniel L. Oltrogge et al., Characterizing the India ASAT
Debris Evolution Using Diverse, Complementary Tools 2 (Am. Astronautical Soc’y, Pa-
per No. AAS 19-889, Aug. 14, 2019), http://celestrak.com/publications/AAS/19-
889/AAS-19-889-pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/53G4-W9MM].
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or arbitrated, leaving injured nations little recourse in obtaining
a judgment and reparations for damage sustained as a result of
another state’s activities in space. The initial proposal for Liabil-
ity for Space Vehicle Accidents was submitted to COPOUS by
the United States in 1962.100 By 1969, the International Law
Commission recognized that a further distinction needed to be
made between state responsibility and state liability, specifically
“responsibility for risk arising out of the performance of certain
lawful activities, such as spatial and nuclear activities.”101
Non-spacefaring states were especially concerned with the
negative consequences of space activities by the two major space
powers at the time.102 In stark contrast to the vagueness of Arti-
cle VII, the Liability Convention text established specific forms
of liability for state action in space, the atmosphere, and joint
enterprise action to place objects in space. In this sense, the Lia-
bility Convention supplements Article VII of the OST, determin-
ing liability for actions depending on the physical location of
the injury.103 While this may seem to contradict a reading of Ar-
ticle VII as imposing strict liability regardless of location, two
arguments defeat a general application of strict liability to all
situations. First, the specific provisions of the Liability Conven-
tion should supersede the generalized language contained in
Article VII under the principle of lex specialis derogat legi gener-
ali.104 Second, Article 31(3)(A) of the VCLT recognizes that sub-
sequent agreements made by state parties inform the
interpretation of the previous agreement.105 Supporting the lex
specialis argument, the Liability Convention represents a subse-
quent agreement used to interpret the generalized provision
contained in Article VII of the OST.
The Liability Convention defines “space object” to include the
physical launch vehicle, parts of the launch vehicle, and compo-
nents of the space object.106 This definition clearly encompasses
parts of a launch vehicle or space object designed to be sepa-
rated, whether during flight or as part of the object’s purpose
once orbit has been achieved. It is less clear if “component parts
100 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm.
on the Work of Its First Session, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/6 (1962).
101 STUBBE, supra note 50, at 108.
102 Id. at 127.
103 Cf. id. at 132–33.
104 Id. at 134.
105 See Mineiro, supra note 72, at 323–24.
106 Liability Convention, supra note 15, art. I(d).
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of a space object” also includes debris from an intentional or
unintentional breakup, though persuasive arguments exist that
debris should be considered as components of a space object.107
When damage to a state’s space object results from the space
activities of multiple states, Article IV of the Liability Convention
addresses liability for that damage.108 For example, if State A’s
launch activity damages State B’s space object, and such damage
then damages State C’s object, reparations are apportioned be-
tween States A and B commensurate with the extent they were at
fault.
C. THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION
The Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) pro-
hibits the use of military or other hostile environmental modifi-
cation techniques.109 The treaty text specifically prohibits
“deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics,
composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, litho-
sphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.”110 Ar-
guments have been raised that the intentional breakup of
objects in outer space may be a form of environmental modifica-
tion prohibited by the treaty if the resulting modification to the
environment was envisioned as a means of warfare.111 Manipula-
tion of the EM environment or the Van Allen radiation belts
may also be prohibited by ENMOD if the effects of such an
ASAT attack have “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects” on
the natural environment.112
D. THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AND CURRENT ASAT
NEGOTIATIONS
In 1978, in conjunction with Presidential Directive 37 issued
by President Carter, negotiations began with the U.S.S.R. over
restricting ASAT weapons.113 While no deal was reached by the
107 See Mirmina, supra note 82, at 303–04.
108 Liability Convention, supra note 15, art. IV.
109 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of En-
vironmental Modification Techniques art. I, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108
U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter ENMOD].
110 Id. art. II.
111 Cf. Christopher M. Petras, The Debate over the Weaponization of Space—A Mili-
tary-Legal Conspectus, 28 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 171, 195 (2003).
112 See ENMOD, supra note 109, art. I.
113 See Johnson-Freese, supra note 73, at 7; see also MICHAEL SHEEHAN, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL POLITICS OF SPACE 97 (2007).
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time negotiations broke off after the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan in 1979, the U.S.S.R. continued to pursue restrictions on
ASAT employment by presenting draft treaties to the U.N. in
1981 and 1983.114 The draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Use of Force in Outer Space and From Space Against the Earth
proposed a prospective ban on the development of new ASAT
systems, and it would require the destruction of all current sys-
tems in a state’s inventory.115 The Reagan administration op-
posed any restrictions on ASAT development, and it arguably
reinterpreted the Cold War-era Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty in a manner that allowed the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) to continue development on defensive space-based ASAT
and ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems.116
A combination of cost overruns, technological limitations,
and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the demise of SDI,117
and with it, any contemporary concern for an ASAT treaty. Lim-
ited development occurred in the United States during the
1990s, with programs such as KE-ASAT and the MIRACL laser
receiving scant attention and funding.118 Following the unilat-
eral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty in
2002, Russia and China became vocal proponents of negotiating
further arms restriction in outer space, submitting a proposal to
the 2002 meeting of the Conference on Disarmament that advo-
cated for continuing the ad hoc committee on the Prevention of
an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).119 China and Russia
also submitted a joint working paper that contained the draft
114 Id.
115 Conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer
Space and From Space Against the Earth, in letter dated Aug. 19, 1983 from the
First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to the Secretary-General, at
2, U.N. Doc. A/38/194 (Aug. 23, 1983) [hereinafter PPWT] (containing the
draft of the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty
(PPWT)).
116 Johnson-Freese, supra note 73, at 8, 13–14.
117 See Donald R. Baucom, The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles, 29 J. SOC. POL. &
ECON. STUD. 143, 185 (2004).
118 Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIEN-
TISTS 6–8 (Jan. 2012), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/
documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/
32DB-2E8G].
119 See Sadeh, supra note 8, at 52, 54; see also Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race
in Space (PAROS) Treaty, CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-
space-paros-treaty/ [https://perma.cc/X3FP-GKS2].
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text for an international framework that would prevent the de-
ployment of weapons in outer space,120 which would expand the
OST restrictions on WMDs to any conventional weapon.121 Both
proposals continue to be met with stiff resistance, despite signifi-
cant support in annual U.N. General Assembly resolutions.122
Russia and China continued their pursuit of selective restric-
tions on ASAT and BMD systems with the Treaty on the Preven-
tion of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT),
submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 2008.123 The
PPWT was a significant overhaul of the 2002 submission, con-
taining comprehensive definitions and context-specific re-
straints that built upon the proposed PAROS framework,
including a no-first-use provision of kinetic-energy ASAT weap-
ons.124 The U.S. delegation to the Conference raised substantial
concerns, citing a lack of constraints or limitations in numerous
areas, such as restraints on the research and development, pro-
duction, and storage of ASAT weapons, or the operational de-
ployment of ground-, sea-, and air-based counter-space
weapons.125 The U.S. delegation concluded that restrictions on
120 See Letter dated June 27, 2002 from the Permanent Rep. of the People’s
Republic of China and the Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Confer-
ence Transmitting the Chinese, English and Russian Texts of a Working Paper
Entitled “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the
Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of
Force Against Outer Space Objects,” at 2–3, U.N. Doc. CD/1679 (June 28, 2002).
121 See Sadeh, supra note 8, at 54.
122 See id. at 54–55; see also Press Release, Preventing Outer Space Arms Race
Would Avert Grave Danger; Possible New Verifiable Bilateral, Multilateral Agree-
ments Needed, Says Draft Text in First Committee, U.N. Press Release GA/DIS/
3371 (Oct. 20, 2008), https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/gadis3371.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/D5QU-5JPZ] [hereinafter PPWT Draft Text Press Release]
(statement by Karen House); U.S. Mission to Int’l Orgs. in Geneva, Debate on
Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) of the General Assembly’s First Committee
(Oct. 22, 2010), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/11/03/outer-space/
[https://perma.cc/5LU3-KQV2] (statement by Ambassador Laura Kennedy).
123 See Sadeh, supra note 8, at 54.
124 See Letter dated Feb. 12, 2008 from the Permanent Rep. of the Russian
Federation and the Permanent Rep. of China to the Conference on Disarma-
ment addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting the
Russian and Chinese Texts of the Draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement
of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer
Space Objects (PPWT)” Introduced by the Russian Federation and China, at 2–3,
U.N. Doc. CD/1839 (Feb. 29, 2008).
125 Letter dated Aug. 19, 2008 from the Permanent Rep. of the United States
of America Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting
Comments on the Draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in
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space-based weapons were designed to counter a real or per-
ceived U.S. technological advantage in light of the decades-long
work with SDI and Star Wars.126 China and Russia responded to
the criticisms set forth by the U.S. in a letter to the Conference
dated August 18, 2009, clarifying that the PPWT was not de-
signed to prohibit all use of force in outer space, only to restrict
the use of force against space-based objects, with the exception
of an Article 51 self-defense scenario.127 Further, the letter
pointed out that PPWT does not attempt to mitigate the issue of
debris resulting from ground-, sea-, and air-based ASAT at-
tacks.128 The letter readily acknowledges that the draft PPWT
text would allow a state to destroy its own satellite (or the satel-
lite of another state) using any of the unrestricted means of en-
gagement if it did not constitute a hostile use of force contrary
to Articles I and II of the draft.129
In 2017, the U.N. General Assembly proposed establishing a
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to make recommenda-
tions on substantive provisions of an internationally binding
framework for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.130
While the program of work has yet to conclude, on January 31,
2019, the chair of the committee issued a report that identified
the recognized principles of international law in outer space.131
While no comprehensive treaty has entered into force explicitly
regulating the use of ASAT weapons, the principles identified in
Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects
(PPWT)” as Contained in Document CD/1839 of 29 Feb. 2008, at 7, U.N. Doc.
CD/1847 (Aug. 26, 2008) [hereinafter U.S. Letter on the Draft PPWT].
126 Cf. PPWT Draft Text Press Release, supra note 122.
127 See Letter dated Aug.18, 2009 from the Permanent Rep. of China and the
Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament
addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting Answers to
the Principal Questions and Comments on the Draft “Treaty on Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against
Outer Space Objects (PPWT)” Introduced by the Russian Federation and China
and Issued as Document CD/1839 Dated 29 February 2008, at 3, U.N. Doc. CD/
1872 (Aug. 18, 2009).
128 See id. at 4.
129 Id. at 4–5.
130 See G.A. Res. 72/250, ¶ 3 (Dec. 24, 2017).
131 See U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, Report by the Chair of the Group
of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.un.org/disarmament/
wp-content/uploads/2019/02/oral-report-chair-gge-paros-2019-01-31.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BSJ8-JEV4].
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the GGE report are likely the most accurate contemporary state-
ment with regard to state conduct in outer space.132
IV. DISCOURAGING KINETIC-ENERGY ASAT WEAPONS
THROUGH DEBRIS LIABILITY
One proposed method for restricting the use of kinetic-en-
ergy ASAT weapons is to impose liability on the launching state
for damage caused by any resulting debris. Depending on the
property and context, liability can be determined on an inten-
tional, strict, or negligence basis. For damage caused by kinetic-
interceptor use, it is necessary to understand the intended target
and purpose behind the launch before assessing liability. If the
purpose of the launch and intended target are part of a larger
armed conflict, an injured state would need to navigate the con-
voluted landscape of war claims to determine whether liability
could be assessed against the launching state.133
In conditions outside of armed conflict (ASAT weapons test-
ing, uncontrolled reentry of a satellite, etc.), where recovery is
objectively more permissive, strict liability may be imposed
under an assumption-of-risk doctrine.134 Establishing strict liabil-
ity for damage caused by such conditions would permit recovery
for any damage to a satellite other than the intended target,
such as a subsequent collision between a piece of debris and a
third-party satellite.135 Alternatively, accepting a threshold of
negligence would permit recovery only in situations where the
injured party could demonstrate that an ASAT operation was
132 See id.
133 Arguments exist for whether combat-related damages should be recovered
through international agreements and arbitration at the end of hostilities or
through individual claims against the state. For example, Kenneth Bullock sug-
gests that one avenue of recovery for tort-based human rights violations and war
crimes during conflict is the Foreign Claims Act (FCA), even though the FCA has
traditionally been used to compensate victims of noncombat-related death, in-
jury, and property damage. Kenneth Bullock, United States Tort Liability for War
Crimes Abroad: An Assessment and Recommendation, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139,
140–41, 154 (1995). Another example is the Commander’s Emergency Response
Program funds that the United States uses to compensate victims of collateral
damage in combat-related actions. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
07-699, MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF SOLATIA
AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2007); U.S. ARMY JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 233–34
(2012).
134 See Mirmina, supra note 82, at 303–04.
135 See id.
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conducted without due care.136 If an ASAT test was conducted at
a high altitude, or the intercept occurred at an upward (rather
than at a downward) angle,137 the result would be a larger por-
tion of persistent debris and would place other spacecraft at in-
creased risk of collision.
Orbiting debris poses an inherent threat to all spacefaring ac-
tivities, as demonstrated by the multiple natural collisions re-
corded in the past couple decades. As the COPUOS debris
mitigation guidelines suggest, states should exercise restraint
over intentional orbital breakups in order to keep the amount
of debris in orbit at a manageable level.138 However, as previ-
ously noted, the guidelines are not legally binding mandates.
Since states are not bound by the mitigation guidelines, creation
of debris is constrained only by the level of risk that nations are
willing to accept when conducting operations in space, as well as
the costs they may incur from damage to their vessels.
Since the immediate space around Earth containing LEO,
MEO, and GEO orbits can be treated as a closed system that
does not produce any waste on its own, any debris in orbit is a
result of human space activity.139 In this closed system, there is a
negative externality derived not only from the intentional crea-
tion of debris but also from an increased likelihood of addi-
tional collisions envisioned by the Kessler Syndrome.140 By
imposing high liability costs on the intentional creation of deb-
ris resulting from kinetic impacts, states should alter their be-
havior and choose to develop and employ ASAT weapons that
do not require kinetic impact to achieve the desired degrada-
tion of adversary space capability. This theory is founded on the
liability provisions contained in the OST and the Liability Con-
vention and can potentially incorporate transboundary harm
norms through Article IX of the OST. However, as demon-
strated by several intentional breakups in the past two decades,
the current liability provisions are not enough to dissuade states
136 See Plantz, supra note 49, at 605.
137 See Marco Langbroek, Why India’s ASAT Test Was Reckless, DIPLOMAT (Apr.
30, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/why-indias-asat-test-was-reckless/
[https://perma.cc/H5GN-8YME].
138 See Progress Report of the Working Group on Space Debris, supra note 51,
at 4.
139 The system is not completely closed, as debris in LEO and MEO will eventu-
ally degrade into the Earth’s atmosphere depending on the altitude of the debris.
140 The negative externality is the threat posed to third-party space systems that
are at risk of collision from debris created by intentional or unintentional
breakups.
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from conducting kinetic-energy ASAT tests. Since space tracking
technology is currently limited to resolving debris at 10 centime-
ters or larger, attribution for damage can be an issue, since an
impact with a piece of debris much smaller than 10 centimeters
can still have a catastrophic impact on a satellite.141
Under the OST and Liability Convention, liability for damage
occurring in outer space requires a showing of fault on the part
of the launching state or must occur as a result of an interna-
tionally wrongful act under the Liability Convention.142 Trans-
boundary harm norms require the state to take appropriate
measures to mitigate any potential harm, and states can argue
that recent kinetic-energy intercepts have been intentionally de-
signed to mitigate harm.143 Finally, with the exception of an im-
permissible use of force under the U.N. Charter, the liability
costs discussed here exist only outside of an international armed
conflict.
A. ARE SUFFICIENT COSTS IMPOSED ON STATES FOR NEGATIVE
EXTERNALITIES RESULTING FROM USE OF KINETIC-
ENERGY ASAT WEAPONS?
Both the OST and the Liability Convention address the issue
of responsibility for damage to a spacecraft, establishing liability
for situationally dependent contexts. Article VI of the OST
provides:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with
the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.144
The language clearly imputes international responsibility for ac-
tivities of governments and their persons conducted in outer
space. But international responsibility does not equate to inter-
national liability until Article VI is read in conjunction with Arti-
cle VII, which provides:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory
141 See Plantz, supra note 49, at 595–96, 605.
142 Id. at 603–05.
143 See STUBBE, supra note 50, at 4–6.
144 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. VI.
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or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for dam-
age to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridi-
cal persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth,
in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies.145
The Liability Convention, treated as lex specialis in the context
of damage resulting from launch activities, provides for strict lia-
bility when damage occurs on the Earth’s surface or to an air-
craft.146 Article III of the Liability Convention imputes liability
on a state for damage that occurs in outer space only if the dam-
age is “due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible.”147 Article VI, in paragraph 2, prohibits exonera-
tion of claims for state activities “where the damage has resulted
from activities conducted by a launching State which are not in
conformity with international law including, in particular, the
Charter of the United Nations and the [Outer Space Treaty].”148
There is support for treating the previously mentioned provi-
sions—Articles VI and VII of the OST and Article VII of the Lia-
bility Convention—as a distinct legal regime that provides
remedies specific to the conduct of states in outer space.149 If
damage occurs on the surface of the Earth or to an aircraft in
flight, a state’s liability is absolute under Article VII of the OST
and Article II of the Liability Convention, while liability for dam-
age that occurs in space must be established by a determination
of fault under OST Article VI and Liability Convention Article
III.150 Therefore, a state that suffers damage as a result of a ki-
netic-energy ASAT launch that is not in conformity with interna-
tional law should have a remedy through Article VII of the OST
and Article IV of the Liability Convention, even if the spacecraft
suffering damage is not the intended target of the operation.151
However, no international prohibition on the use of kinetic-en-
ergy ASAT weapons currently exists, so the only likely situation
where an ASAT engagement is ineligible for exoneration would
145 Id. art. VII.
146 See STUBBE, supra note 50, at 133–34.
147 Liability Convention, supra note 15, art. III.
148 Id. art. VI(2).
149 Cf. STUBBE, supra note 50, at 139–40.
150 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, arts. VI–VII; Liability Convention, supra
note 15, arts. II–III; see STUBBE, supra note 50, at 133 & n.352.
151 Liability Convention, supra note 15, art. IV.
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be an attack not in conformity with the use of force under the
U.N. Charter.152
Even for damage caused by kinetic-energy ASAT launches that
are in conformity with international law, liability still could be
assigned to the state under a theory of failing to prevent trans-
boundary harm. As early as 1969, the International Law Com-
mission (ILC) recognized that certain internationally lawful
activities should be conducted with an inherent understanding
of the associated heightened risks, such as spatial activities and
the operation of nuclear power sources.153 The resulting work in
developing the “responsibility of risk” concept was adopted as
the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention (Prevention Articles)154
and the Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss (Principles of
Allocation).155 The Prevention Articles “apply to activities not
prohibited by international law,”156 and Article 3 further places
a positive obligation on states to mitigate transboundary harms,
which provides: “The State of origin shall take all appropriate
measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any
event to minimize the risk thereof.”157
Article 7 requires an assessment of the possible transboundary
harms from an activity, including an assessment of potential en-
vironmental harm.158 Article 8 further requires a state to notify
any potentially affected states if the Article 7 risk assessment in-
dicates transboundary harm is likely.159 These provisions are
reminiscent of, and are likely reinforced by, OST Article IX obli-
gations to conduct international consultations when a state’s ac-
tivities in space may interfere with the activities of another. If
152 See id. art. VI(2).
153 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 24 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 233, U.N. Doc. A/7610/Rev.1 (1969), reprinted in [1969]
2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 203, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/220. The concept of trans-
boundary harm was established in Trail Smelter Arbitration. Trail Smelter (U.S. v.
Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941); see STUBBE, supra note 50, at 5.
154 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session,
56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 148–70, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in
[2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 pt. 2
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Prevention].
155 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session,
61 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 106–82, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006), reprinted in
[2006] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 pt .2
[hereinafter Draft Principles of Allocation]; see STUBBE, supra note 50, at 110–11.
156 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 154, at 149, art. 1.
157 Id. at 153, art. 3.
158 Id. at 157, art. 7.
159 Id. at 159, art. 8(1).
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previous kinetic-energy engagements are any indication, the use
of such a weapon is very likely to produce debris in orbit, which
in turn should inform a state’s assessment of the potential risks.
In a hypothetical kinetic-energy ASAT operation, Article 7 re-
quires a state to conduct a risk assessment of potential trans-
boundary harms and then notify potentially affected states
through international consultations in accordance with Article 8
of the Prevention Articles and Article IX of the OST.160 Princi-
ple 3 of the Principles of Allocation ensures prompt and ade-
quate compensation for transboundary harms,161 though since
the specific harm discussed here occurs in the course of space
activities, states can also rely on Article III and the associated
remediation measures contained in the Liability Convention.162
B. PRESENT LIABILITY REGIMES ARE INSUFFICIENT CONSTRAINTS
IN THE CONTEXT OF NONAGGRESSION AND ARE
INAPPLICABLE DURING ARMED CONFLICT
The liability regime, as it presently exists, imposes inadequate
costs to restrain the continued use of kinetic-energy ASAT weap-
ons. The question of compensation for damage resulting from a
kinetic-energy weapon remains a hypothetical one, as no state
has had an opportunity to present such a claim. Since kinetic-
energy attacks are not internationally wrongful if conducted in a
nonaggressive manner (such as testing against a state’s own sat-
ellite), an injured state must either be able to attribute the cause
of damage to the kinetic-energy attack or argue that the launch-
ing state failed to mitigate transboundary harms and ensure its
activities did not cause harmful interference with another state’s
space activities.
If one accepts the argument that debris created from a ki-
netic-energy intercept is a “space object” under the definition
contained in the Liability Convention, states are likely liable for
160 See id.; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. IX.
161 Draft Principles of Allocation, supra note 155, at 108, princ. 3.
162 The only attempt to obtain compensation under the Liability Convention
came after Cosmos 954 scattered radioactive debris across a section of Canadian
wilderness. See Joseph A. Burke, Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects: Definition and Determination of Damages After the Cosmos 954
Incident, 8 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 255, 256 (1984). Canada included two theories of
compensation when it presented its claim to the U.S.S.R.: one under the Liability
Convention and one under the generally recognized principles of international
law. Id. at 273–74. Canada was partially successful in recovering on its claim,
though the effectiveness of the Liability Convention’s compensation measures
remains questionable. Id. at 279–80.
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any damage caused by collisions with said debris. The intercepts
of FY-1C, USA-193, and Microsat-R involved the owning state
launching a kinetic-energy interceptor at its own satellite; if fur-
ther collisions had resulted from the debris produced, the in-
jured state would likely have a claim under Article III of the
Liability Convention.163 The issue becomes attributing fault to a
state following a collision. As previously noted, the SSN is capa-
ble of tracking debris 10 centimeters or larger in LEO, and its
electro-optical telescopes are capable of 1-meter resolution in
GEO. Debris smaller than 10 centimeters is still capable of caus-
ing immense damage to a satellite, especially as the relative size
disparity between the piece of debris and the satellite decreases
(e.g., a collision between a sub-10-centimeter piece of debris
and a cubesat). Since a collision with a space object can happen
years after an intentional breakup produced the debris, a state
would likely need to use persistent tracking to determine the
lifecycle of the debris that caused the damage. For pieces cata-
logued by the SSN or equivalent space mapping systems, this is
relatively easy to demonstrate.164 For pieces of debris that are
not catalogued due to their size, it becomes much more difficult
to attribute the source. For example, the Cosmos 1934 collision
occurred in 1991, but the collision was not understood until
2005 upon further examination by the NASA Orbital Debris
Program Office.165 As a result of the FY-1C breakup, a projected
35,000 pieces of debris 1 centimeter and larger were produced;
the SSN can only reliably track 2,087 of those pieces, about 6%
of the estimate.166 Further estimates place the amount of tracka-
163 Liability Convention, supra note 15, art. III. OST Article VI places interna-
tional responsibility for activities conducted in outer space by nongovernmental
entities on the state of origin. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. VI. The
OST also requires that activities carried out by such entities are “authoriz[ed]
and continu[ously] supervis[ed] by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” Id.
If a corporate-owned satellite was damaged as a result of a kinetic energy ASAT
test, the sovereignty in which the corporation is a legal entity would likely need to
espouse the claim in order to recover, since the Liability Convention is an inter-
national agreement between sovereigns and does not contain provisions for pri-
vate action or arbitration. See Liability Convention, supra note 15, art. III.
164 See STUBBE, supra note 50, at 44–45. If the piece of debris is catalogued, it
would also be possible to avoid the collision if the satellite was equipped with
maneuvering capabilities. See id. at 49–50, 49 n.195.
165 Accidental Collisions of Catalogued Satellites Identified, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS,
Apr. 2005, at 1, 1, https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/
odqnv9i2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP27-L6PS].
166 KELSO, supra note 67, at 325.
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ble debris in LEO at 10% of the total debris present.167 Since
90% of the debris remains unaccounted for, a collision between
a space object and an untracked piece of debris is quite possible.
And when such a collision occurs, the injured state will have no
recourse under the fault standard contained in Article III of the
Liability Convention.
Transboundary harm norms recognize that some activities,
while not internationally prohibited, still present significant
risks during their operation. States are still required to mitigate
the risk of harm under the Prevention Articles when conducting
such activities. When evaluating whether a kinetic-energy en-
gagement resulting in fragmentation caused transboundary
harm, states would likely argue that the engagements were in-
tentionally designed to reduce the longevity of any debris cre-
ated by deliberately targeting satellites at minimal altitude above
the atmosphere to capture a majority of debris on reentry.168
This argument can be treated as evidence of states taking appro-
priate measures to reduce resulting debris, satisfying the risk as-
sessment obligations under the Prevention Articles. India would
likely argue that it met any obligations contained in Article 3
and Article 7 of the Prevention Articles by issuing a Notice to
Airmen (NOTAM), which created a restricted danger area prior
to the engagement.169 India also stated that it intentionally de-
signed the engagement of Microsat-R to take place in low orbit
and in a downward intercept trajectory.170 If the international
community does not accept that designing a kinetic-energy en-
gagement in an intentionally downward manner satisfies a risk
assessment of transboundary harms under Article 7 of the Pre-
vention Articles,171 then that should trigger OST Article IX in-
ternational consultation and notification obligations under
167 See Manimuthu Gandhi, Towards a Legal Regime for the Protection of Space As-
sets, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW, supra note 8, at 117, 123.
168 Statements made by the U.S. and Indian governments relating to the en-
gagement of USA-193 and Microsat-R both purport to have taken deliberate steps
to mitigate any resulting debris, albeit with mixed actual results. See Mineiro,
supra note 72, at 349; Frequently Asked Questions on Mission Shakti, supra note
5.
169 See supra text accompanying note 99.
170 See Analytical Graphics, Inc., 2019 Indian Anti-Satellite Weapon Test – 3/28/
2019 Update, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PZhtc-rFbvM [https://perma.cc/QZ2R-G2BD]. A “downward intercept”
occurs when a kinetic energy weapon impacts the target during the downward
portion of its trajectory arc. This type of intercept is assumed from the resulting
debris created and tracked following the Microsat-R engagement. See id.
171 See Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 154, art. 7.
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Article 8 of the Prevention Articles.172 However, the OST fails to
expound upon what actions satisfy the consultation require-
ment. State practice has also failed to clarify any expectations for
international consultations. While the United States, Russia,
China, and India have all conducted a kinetic-energy intercept
of a satellite, no state has engaged in an open dialogue prior to
the operation.173 China publicly acknowledged the intercept of
FY-1C twelve days after the event,174 while India issued state-
ments acknowledging the intercept of Microsat-R only hours af-
ter launch.175 The United States publicly announced plans to
destroy USA-193, but commentators have since raised concerns
that simply announcing the operation did not go far enough
towards reinforcing a norm of Article IX consultations.176 With-
out concrete expectations of what satisfies Article IX obligations,
a launching state has immense latitude in defining what consti-
tutes risk to other nations when addressing both OST obliga-
tions and an assessment of risk for transboundary harms. Since
failing to conduct Article IX consultations does not impute lia-
bility onto the launching state, the state can currently point to
intentional design of the intercept as evidence of appropriate
mitigation actions and rely upon previous state practice when
faced with a hypothetical transboundary harm claim.177
Finally, the liability regime also assumes a kinetic-energy en-
gagement that does not occur during an international armed
conflict. Article III of the OST states that activity in outer space
is subject to the recognized principles of international law and
the Charter of the United Nations;178 outer space activities con-
ducted during a time of internationally sanctioned armed con-
flict would be peremptorily governed by the laws of armed
conflict. Further, a state is likely not liable as a result of trans-
boundary harm that occurs during wartime.179 While neither the
Prevention Articles nor the Principles of Allocation exonerate
transboundary harms that occur during wartime, similar legal
172 See id. art. 8; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. IX.
173 See Mineiro, supra note 72, at 346.
174 See Milowicki & Johnson-Freese, supra note 68, at 3.
175 Cf. Miglani & Das, supra note 2.
176 See Mineiro, supra note 72, at 352–53 (arguing that the United States missed
an opportunity to clarify and guide future international consultations under Arti-
cle IX).
177 See id. at 353.
178 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. III.
179 See Kaplow, supra note 91, at 1245.
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frameworks do recognize exoneration from liability under war-
time conditions.180
V. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF KINETIC-ENERGY
ASAT WEAPONS UNDER THE RECOGNIZED
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT
Another option advanced for constraining the use of kinetic-
energy ASAT weapons is an argument that their use may violate
the recognized principles of the law of armed conflict (LOAC).
The use of kinetic-energy weapons in space produces persistent
hazards to other space objects that cannot be rendered harmless
by incorporating comparable planning considerations as when
arms are directed against terrestrial targets. Collateral damage
with typical conventional weapons can be mitigated through
precision guidance, positive identification prior to release, and
other actions taken in furtherance of distinction and propor-
tionality assessments required by international humanitarian
law. Dual-use satellites also present a challenge to military com-
manders in that commanders must demonstrate the military ad-
vantage gained from destroying the object.181 However,
destroying or degrading an adversary’s ability to communicate,
navigate, or collect intelligence through a space-based asset will
almost certainly justify damage to a civilian object used for mili-
tary purposes.182 The debris created from kinetic-energy engage-
ments presents an entirely different problem, since the risk it
poses may not be realized for years after the engagement. None-
theless, a potentially unrealized risk of collision with a space ob-
ject is unlikely to outweigh a proportionality balancing test for
determining whether the attack was indiscriminate. Since meth-
ods of engagement that decrease the resulting debris exist, and
targeting both military and dual-use satellites will undoubtedly
provide a concrete military advantage for a commander, the
180 See Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage, art. 6(1), Sept. 12, 1997, 2241 U.N.T.S. 270 (establishing exon-
eration from liability as a result of nuclear damage due to an act of armed con-
flict or hostilities); International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, art. III(2)(a), Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 (establishing exoneration
from liability as a result of an oil spill due to an act of war or hostilities).
181 See Bourbonniere & Haeck, supra note 42, at 6, 9.
182 See id. at 6. Examples of dual-use satellites include some communications
satellites, weather satellites, and Global Positioning System satellites.
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principles of LOAC would likely not prevent the use of kinetic-
energy ASAT weapons.
A. ARE KINETIC-ENERGY ASAT WEAPONS LEGAL MEANS AND
METHODS OF WARFARE?
Article 22 of the 1907 Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) states that “[t]he right of
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlim-
ited.”183 Over time, this has become codified as a recognized
principle of international law, contained in numerous interna-
tional agreements regulating the conduct of warfare.184 Article
36 of the Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I (AP I)
places a positive obligation on states to investigate the legality of
new weapons, means, and methods of warfare in the course of
their adoption.185 When evaluating whether a particular means
or method is lawful in the course of armed conflict, the Interna-
tional Committee for the Red Cross suggests the following analy-
sis: (Element 1) evaluate whether the state is restrained from
using the means or method because of any obligation under in-
ternational treaty law; (Element 2) evaluate specific prohibitions
on the means or method under principles of customary interna-
tional law (CIL); and (Element 3) investigate any general re-
strictions contained in treaty law or CIL.186 It is unlikely that any
of the established CIL prohibitions on specific weapons, Ele-
ment 2, apply to kinetic-energy ASAT weapons.187 Element 1,
183 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague IV].
184 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I) art. 35(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I];
see also Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons pmbl., July 7, 2017, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.229/2017/8; Convention on Cluster Munitions pmbl., May 30,
2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
pmbl., Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211; Convention on Prohibitions or Restric-
tions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects pmbl., Oct. 10, 1980, 1342
U.N.T.S. 137.
185 Additional Protocol I, supra note 184, art. 36.
186 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL REVIEW OF NEW
WEAPONS, MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE 11 (2006), https://e-brief.icrc.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/09/12-A-Guide-to-the-Legal-Review-of-New-Weap-
ons.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4QT-Q92G].
187 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 251–96 (2005). Customary international
law rules relevant to this analysis are discussed in this section.
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treaty obligations establishing restrictions, may be applicable to
kinetic-energy ASAT weapons as a result of the debris produced
if unlawful environmental modifications are made during the
conduct of armed conflict; Element 1 will be discussed in Sec-
tion V of this Article. Military necessity, proportionality, and dis-
tinction analyses under Element 3 are applicable to continued
employment of kinetic-energy ASAT weapons, though ultimately
do not prevent their use.
1. Military Necessity
Military necessity is generally understood to be the means “in-
dispensable for securing the ends of the war.”188 Military neces-
sity contains two elements: a “military requirement to undertake
a certain measure,” and that the measure is “not forbidden by
the laws of war.”189 The concept of military necessity first ap-
peared in Articles 15 and 16 of the Lieber Code, promulgated as
General Orders No. 100 in 1863.190 Article 15 allowed for “all
destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and chan-
nels of traffic, travel, or communication,” but it was restrained
by Article 16’s prohibition against “wanton devastation of a dis-
trict.”191 As Marco Sassòli stated, “[t]o allow attacks on persons
other than combatants would violate the principle of necessity,
because victory can be achieved by overcoming only the combat-
ants of a country . . . .”192 Military necessity is not a prohibition
on destruction per se but an instruction that the person or ob-
ject attacked must concretely contribute to victory in armed
conflict.
188 Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and
Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 215 (1998); see U.S.
ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
DESKBOOK 133–34 (David Lee ed., 5th rev. ed. 2015) (“That principle which justi-
fies those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable
for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”).
189 See LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra note 188, at 134.
190 See id. at 96.
191 See FRANCIS LIEBER, GENERAL ORDERS NO. 100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, arts. 15–16 (Apr. 24,
1863) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE].
192 Marco Sassòli, Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of “Military Objec-
tives” for the Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, in NEW WARS,
NEW LAWS?: APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 181, 202
(David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).
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2. Proportionality
Jus in bello proportionality balances military expediency
against countervailing humanitarian interests, such as when
targeting dual-use infrastructure or evaluating expected collat-
eral damage.193 AP I Article 51(5)(b) states that an attack is dis-
proportionate if the incidental loss of civilian life or damage to
civilian objects is “excessive in relation to the concrete and di-
rect military advantage” expected as a result of the attack.194 Ar-
ticle 57(2) requires commanders to minimize incidental loss or
damage when evaluating the proportionality of an attack.195 Pre-
vious judicial decisions evaluating proportionality afford military
commanders broad discretion in their perceptions of expectant
advantage.196 The Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Com-
mittee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign in
Kosovo came to the conclusion that experienced military com-
manders and human rights lawyers are likely to assign different
values to military advantage gained from a strike, and it sug-
gested that the determination of the value of the strike be “that
of the ‘reasonable military commander.’”197
3. Distinction
The principle of distinction requires military commanders to
distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives when
targeting an adversary’s infrastructure during armed conflict.198
Military objectives are defined as “objects whose ‘destruction,
193 See Michael A. Newton, Reframing the Proportionality Principle, 51 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 867, 872 (2018).
194 Additional Protocol I, supra note 184, art. 51(5)(b).
195 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii). The U.S. position prefers the term “all practicable pre-
cautions” rather than “all feasible precautions” so as not to place the burden of
employing precision-guided munitions on every engagement. See LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra note 188, at 148.
196 See Newton, supra note 193, at 875–78. Professor Newton’s article states that
“[t]he use of markedly strong modifiers is a core truism that recurs in virtually
every contextual application.” Id. at 875. This mirrors the “clearly excessive” eval-
uation standard used by the International Criminal Court (ICC), and it likely
affords similar deference to military commanders and their perceptions of pre-
sent military necessity. See id. at 878.
197 See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ¶ 50, 39 I.L.M. 1257
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, June 8, 2000) [hereinafter Final Re-
port to the Prosecutor]. For an evaluation of the “reasonable” standard in the LOAC
context, see Geoffrey S. Corn, Humanitarian Regulation of Hostilities: The Decisive
Element of Context, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 768–72 (2018).
198 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 184, art. 48.
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capture or neutralization’ . . . ‘offers a definite military advan-
tage’” at the time of the action.199 AP I Article 51 prohibits indis-
criminate attacks, specifically attacks not directed at a precise
target, attacks whose effects are not directed against a military
objective or cannot be limited as required, and attacks that do
not discriminate between military and civilian objects.200 The In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross’s Commentary of 1977
suggests that weapons whose effects “cannot be limited as re-
quired”201 refers primarily to biological or nuclear weapons, or
in the alternative, describes the manner in which weapons are
employed.202 This suggests that there are means and methods
that become indiscriminate depending on how they are em-
ployed, rather than LOAC acting as a prophylactic ban on cer-
tain weapons outside of other treaty obligations.
While some satellites are purely military infrastructure in na-
ture, others are dual-use objects that provide services to both
military and civilian components of a state.203 In such cases, the
most restrictive assessment of distinction would require a causal
link between the object and the actual degradation to the adver-
sary’s military capability.204 The NATO bombing of Radio Televi-
sion Serbia (RTS) is an example of assessing the causal link
between dual-use objects and the expected military advan-
tage.205 Following a review of the strike by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
European Court of Human Rights, the tribunal determined that
because the station served to transmit military communications,
it was a legitimate military target, despite the deaths of sixteen
civilians inside.206
199 Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War,
95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1783 (2009) (quoting Additional Protocol I, art. 52(2)).
200 Additional Protocol I, supra note 184, art. 51(4).
201 Id.
202 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTO-
COLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 623
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY OF 1977].
203 See Kaplow, supra note 91, at 1247.
204 See Sitaraman, supra note 199, at 1784–85.
205 See id. at 1786.
206 See id. at 1786–87. However, the ICTY went on to state that the destruction
of RTS and the resulting civilian deaths would not have been justified if the sta-
tion had only been broadcasting propaganda. See Final Report to the Prosecutor,
supra note 197, at 1278.
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B. ANALYSIS OF A HYPOTHETICAL KINETIC-ENERGY ASAT
ENGAGEMENT
The principle of necessity would likely not prevent an attack
on a military satellite, so far as the military commander could
identify how the destruction of the objective furthered the war
effort. Necessity, however, may dictate the means and methods
employed to destroy the target satellite. Just as the Lieber
Code’s principle against unnecessary suffering was applied to
the ban on small-caliber explosive bullets in 1868,207 destruction
of property must not rise to a wanton level. David Kaplow uses
the example of a state that possesses both a directed-energy
weapon and a kinetic-energy ASAT interceptor: if both weapons
can cause the desired “hard-kill” destruction of a satellite,208 an
argument exists that using a kinetic-energy interceptor would re-
sult in wanton destruction because of the debris resulting from
the collision.209 However, this argument imputes a definition of
“necessary” into military necessity that does not reflect the prin-
ciples contained in the Lieber Code or subsequent international
agreements.210
Arguably, if a state faces a choice between destruction of an
orbital satellite and an attack on the ground control segment of
the satellite network, a military necessity analysis should weigh
against the destruction of the satellite and consequently elimi-
nates any debris that would otherwise result from the satellite’s
destruction. However, this argument changes the calculus of the
attack, trading the potential for loss of human life operating the
ground segment for the avoidance of additional debris. How-
ever, if the military advantage gained from the destruction of
the ground segment is no greater than the destruction of the
satellite, this calculus is contrary to the underlying principles of
the law of armed conflict, which seek to humanize conflict when
207 See Carnahan, supra note 188, at 215.
208 “Hard kills” are measures that physically counterattack an incoming threat
by destroying the threat in a way that severely impedes or kills the threat.
209 See Kaplow, supra note 91, at 1248.
210 See id.; Carnahan, supra note 188, at 226 (arguing that military necessity was
a restraint on general seizure of property, but it allowed the seizure or destruc-
tion of property that contributed to the adversary’s war efforts). See generally An-
nex to the Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 75 (Dietrich
Schindler & Jirı́ Toman eds., 3d rev. ed. 1988).
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possible.211 Because the described situation is plausible in a hy-
pothetical future conflict, it is impossible to adopt a per se rule
against targeting an orbital asset.
A reasonable military commander would likely assign a rela-
tively high value to a kinetic-energy ASAT strike that crippled or
disrupted an adversary’s communications, navigation, or target-
ing infrastructure, though the commander would need to bal-
ance the relatively high value of the attack against the potential
hazards of debris remaining in orbit. Further difficulty arises
when attempting to evaluate the adverse effects of such an en-
gagement. Computer modeling may be able to predict, with
some accuracy, the amount and characteristics of debris pro-
duced, but it is quite possible that the negative impact of the
debris remaining in orbit will not be fully realized until decades
after the engagement. Facing a choice between the destruction
of an adversary’s signals intelligence satellite and the incalcula-
ble probability that a fragment from the engagement will collide
with another space asset, a commander is likely justified in ac-
cepting this hypothetical risk for the immediate and concrete
advantage gained.
For an ASAT engagement against a dual-use satellite, com-
manders would need to ensure that the purpose behind target-
ing the satellite is to degrade the adversary’s ability to effectively
execute military operations. In an age where Command, Con-
trol, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) satellites are essential to perform a
multitude of military actions,212 targeting the GPS, communica-
tions, and imagery satellites that perform C4ISR functions al-
most certainly satisfies the causal link analysis of distinction. The
expected military advantage of degrading such networks will
only increase as modern militaries become further dependent
on space-based assets. The bombing of RTS during the Kosovar
conflict and the resulting post hoc review provide a benchmark
for legitimate targeting of dual-use objects in a modern
context.213
An argument exists that the collateral damage resulting from
a kinetic-energy ASAT engagement makes such a weapon inher-
ently indiscriminate, likening the second-order effects of orbital
211 See Hague IV, supra note 183, arts. 22, 25; Sitaraman, supra note 199, at
1756.
212 See Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Synergy of Air and Space, AIRPOWER J., Summer
1998, at 5, 6–7.
213 See supra notes 203–206 and accompanying text.
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debris to foreseeable after effects of other conventional, chemi-
cal, biological, and nuclear weapons.214 However, the argument
is predicated on the so far unrealized potential for collateral
damage in congested orbits, and it must still be weighed against
the anticipated military advantage at the time of the operation.
Utilizing kinetic-energy ASAT weapons in a downward-intercept
manner is intended to reduce or minimize the amount of debris
that remains in orbit after the impact, which is compatible with
the purpose of the limited effects provision and the associated
text contained in the Commentary of 1977.
VI. PROHIBITIONS ON WIDESPREAD, LONG-TERM, AND
SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE NATURAL
ENVIRONMENT
A further suggestion for constraining the use of kinetic-energy
ASAT weapons has been through environmental protection re-
gimes that prohibit certain damage to the natural environment
as a result of warfare. These regimes have grown in conjunction
with international humanitarian law’s restrictions on means and
methods of warfare, but they are also specialized regimes that
seek to address hostile use of environmental modification tech-
niques as a means of warfare. In their original form, these re-
gimes were designed to protect the natural environment, since
humanity depends on it for survival. Future iterations have re-
moved the human considerations and seek to protect inten-
tional damage to the natural environment. Kinetic-energy ASAT
operations have undoubtedly contributed to the modification of
the natural environment, placing thousands of pieces of persis-
tent debris in orbit, resulting in intentional and unintentional
pollution. Despite this modification from artificial debris, ex-
isting environmental protection regimes provide minimal re-
course to prevent future kinetic engagements that fall outside of
using them as a means of warfare designed to adapt outer space
as a weapon.
While ENMOD specifically address the modification of the at-
mosphere and outer space, it only prohibits intentional use of
environmental modification as a weapon against an adversary,
and it does not adequately constrain methods of warfare that
214 See Kaplow, supra note 91, at 1245 (arguing that the foreseeability of latent
damage from cluster munitions, nuclear fallout, and other persistent effects is
similar to lingering debris in orbit that presents a collision hazard to other ob-
jects in space); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 184, art. 51(5)(b).
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modify the environment as a derivative result. AP I Articles 35
and 55 prohibit both intentional and expected damage to the
natural environment under the vague “widespread, long-term
and severe” standard, but Article 55 requires that the attack
“prejudice the health or survival of the population.”215 Article
8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court places the additional barrier of a proportionality test for
liability, carrying forward this vague standard of damage while
also requiring that the damage be “clearly excessive” when com-
pared to the anticipated overall military advantage of the
strike.216
A. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS UNDER AP I, ENMOD, AND
ROME STATUTE ARTICLE 8(2)(B)(IV).
There are traditionally two approaches to protecting the envi-
ronment: anthropocentric and ecocentric legal regimes.217 Prior
to the entry into force of ENMOD, all previous international
agreements protecting the environment were anthropocentric,
protecting the environment for its ability to sustain human
life.218 Examples of anthropocentric regimes include Hague IV
and the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV).219 At-
tacks that only damaged parts of the environment that were not
used for human sustainment were exclusively questions of do-
mestic jurisdiction and enforcement, since the anthropocentric
215 Additional Protocol I, supra note 184, arts. 35, 55. The terms “widespread,”
“long-term,” and “severe” are present in all environmental protection regimes,
but they are not defined. Commentaries provide incongruent definitions that
have resulted in a vague standard. This section discusses the various definitions
offered.
216 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
217 See Jessica C. Lawrence & Kevin Jon Heller, The First Ecocentric Environmental
War Crime: The Limits of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.
L. REV. 61, 64 (2007).
218 Id. at 65–66.
219 See Lawrence & Heller, supra note 217, at 65–66; see also Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Hague
IV, supra note 183, arts. 23, 55. Article 23 of Hague IV prohibits destruction of
property unless the destruction is a military necessity, and Article 55 requires an
occupying state to act as an administrator and usufructuary of the enemy state’s
resources, including forests. See Hague IV, supra note 183, arts. 23, 55. Article 53
of Geneva Convention IV provides similar protections for state and personal
property as Article 23 of Hague IV, excusing destruction only for military neces-
sity. See Geneva Convention IV, supra, art. 53.
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regimes identified above prohibit attacks only when they
harmed human beings—and only when they were contrary to
the principles of military necessity.220
Following the devastating defoliation campaign that occurred
during the Vietnam War, a new regime emerged that sought to
protect attacks on the natural environment even in the absence
of direct harm to human beings.221 ENMOD of 1976 and the AP
I established quasi-ecocentric regimes that restricted military ac-
tions that cause “widespread,” “long-lasting,” and “severe effects”
to the natural environment.222 While common language exists
between AP I and ENMOD, defining widespread, long-lasting,
and severe varies across the instruments. For interpreting EN-
MOD, the Committee on Disarmament provided the following
definitions to the thirty-first session of the U.N. General
Assembly:
(a) “widespread”: encompassing an area on the scale of sev-
eral hundred square kilometres;
(b) “long-lasting”: lasting for a period of months, or approxi-
mately a season;
(c) “severe”: involving serious or significant disruption or
harm to human life, natural and economic resources or
other assets.223
The Commentary of 1977 on AP I indicates that the purposes
behind Article 35(3) and Article 55 diverged during working
group negotiations.224 While both Article 35 and Article 55 con-
tain “widespread, long-lasting and severe” language, the intent
of Article 35 was to provide ecocentric environmental protec-
tions while Article 55 was to provide anthropocentric protec-
tions to human sustainability.225 While the travaux préparatoire
220 See Lawrence & Heller, supra note 217, at 65–70; see also LIEBER CODE, supra
note 191, arts. 16, 70 (prohibiting the “wanton devastation of a district” and “use
of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms”).
221 Lawrence & Heller, supra note 217, at 66.
222 See ENMOD, supra note 109, art. 1; Additional Protocol I, supra note 184,
arts. 35(3), 55(1).
223 See Rep. of the Conference of the Comm. on Disarmament on Its Thirty-
First Session, 31 U.N. GOAR Supp. No. 27, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/31/27 (Vol. 1)
(1976).
224 See COMMENTARY OF 1977, supra note 202, at 417–18.
225 See id.; Rep. to Comm. III on the Work of the Working Group Submitted by
the Rapporteur, CD Doc. No. CDDH/III/293 (1975), in 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, at 357, 358–59,
CD Doc. No. CDDH/215/Rev.1 (1977).
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indicates that the drafters envisioned long-term damage would
encompass damage that was not “incidental to conventional war-
fare” (such as artillery bombardment), there was no consensus
on defining a period of time that embodied the language “long-
lasting.”226 No definitions for “widespread” and “severe” are con-
tained in the commentary or travaux.227 The U.S. Army Judge
Advocate General’s Operational Law Handbook provides the fol-
lowing definitions: “the term ‘widespread’ probably means sev-
eral hundred square kilometers, as it does in ENMOD. ‘Severe’
can be explained by [AP I] Article 55’s reference to any act that
‘prejudices the health or survival of the population.’”228
The apparent overlap of provisions contained in ENMOD and
AP I was discussed within the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament, though the U.S. position during negotiations was
that AP I was aimed at protecting the natural environment dur-
ing international armed conflict, while ENMOD is designed to
prevent the use of the environment as a military weapon.229 In
this light, a significant distinction between ENMOD and AP I is
that ENMOD is a single-element violation, while AP I requires
the presence of all three elements due to the conjunctive “and”
in Article 35(3) and Article 55.230 Further, violations of AP I Arti-
cles 35 and 55 are not grave breaches, and along with ENMOD
and Hague IV, produce state responsibility only for illegal
attacks.231
While ENMOD is a single-element liability regime, it requires
a higher threshold of knowledge when imposing liability com-
pared to AP I. ENMOD Article II requires that the environmen-
tal modification technique is employed deliberately by a state to
change the dynamic, composition, or structure of the Earth, in-
cluding the atmosphere and outer space.232 AP I Article 35(3)
prohibits methods or means of warfare intended, or that may be
expected to cause the requisite environmental harm.233 This
broader scope of application is discussed at length in the Com-
226 Id. at 268–69. Some delegates suggested twenty to thirty years as the mini-
mum amount of time, while the Biotope report suggested a reasonable definition
was damage that lasted over ten years. Id.
227 See Lawrence & Heller, supra note 217, at 71–73.
228 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 133, at 326.
229 See COMMENTARY OF 1977, supra note 202, at 414–15.
230 Lawrence & Heller, supra note 217, at 72–73; see also OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 133, at 326.
231 Lawrence & Heller, supra note 217, at 67, 70.
232 See ENMOD, supra note 109, art. 2.
233 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 184, art. 35(3).
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mentary of 1977, and it is a result of the deliberate exclusion of
an “intentional” element in the French text of the treaty, leaving
open the possibility of liability imputed from excessive use of
conventional weapons that result in widespread, long-lasting,
and severe harms to the environment.234 While the same “may
be expected” language is also contained in AP I Article 55, it
further requires that the damage threaten a human population
to violate the provision.235
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute is considered the most
ecocentric iteration of an environmental protection regime to
date.236 The Article makes it a war crime to:
Intentionally launch[ ] an attack in the knowledge that such at-
tack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or dam-
age to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military ad-
vantage anticipated.237
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) carries forward the familiar “widespread,
long-lasting and severe” language common to previous ecocen-
tric regimes, but the Rome Statute also establishes individual
criminal liability for intentionally launching such an attack.238
Due to the relationship between the Rome Statute and the Ge-
neva Conventions, such as the adoption of substantive war
crimes and fundamental notions of due process from the latter,
the International Criminal Court (ICC) would likely interpret
Article 8(2)(b)(iv)’s “widespread, long-term and severe” lan-
guage in line with AP I.239 The Elements of Crimes relating to Arti-
cle 8(2)(b)(iv) explains that the overall “military advantage”
anticipated is not limited by geographic or temporal relation to
the attack, inviting a proportionality assessment.240 It is impor-
tant to note that the actual result of the attack is not relevant for
establishing individual criminal liability; proof of the intentional
initiation of an attack that the individual believed would cause
widespread, long-lasting, and severe environmental harm pro-
234 See COMMENTARY OF 1977, supra note 202, at 418–19.
235 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 184, art. 55.
236 See Lawrence & Heller, supra note 217, at 70.
237 Rome Statute, supra note 216, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
238 Id. art. 25.
239 See Lawrence & Heller, supra note 217, at 73. See generally Rome Statute,
supra note 216, arts. 8(2)(a), 67 (adopting substantive war crimes provisions from
Geneva Convention Common Article II in Article 8 and incorporating due pro-
cess rights from Additional Protocol I Article 67).
240 See Newton, supra note 193, at 883.
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duces liability.241 In addition, the ICC must take into account
the perceived overall military advantage expected by the individ-
ual at the time of initiation, and any post hoc assessment of the
individual’s action must be based only on the information availa-
ble to the individual at the time of attack.242
B. ANTHROPOCENTRIC AND ECOCENTRIC REGIMES ARE
INEFFECTIVE IN CONSTRAINING KINETIC-ENERGY ASAT
WEAPONS
Anthropocentric protection regimes such as Hague IV and
Geneva Convention IV are ineffective in restricting kinetic-en-
ergy ASAT weapons, since these regimes require damage to the
environment that affects the sustainability of human life. AP I’s
quasi-ecocentric extension contained in Article 55 still contains
a similar anthropocentric element as well; the resulting debris
from a kinetic-energy engagement may pose a danger to human
spaceflight, though it likely does not constitute a risk to “the
health or survival of the population.”243 Ecocentric protections
contained in AP I Article 35, ENMOD, and Rome Statute Article
8(2)(b)(iv) are also insufficient to prevent kinetic-energy attacks
because of the muddled definitions of “widespread, long-term
and severe.” Further, the proportionality analysis when assessing
liability under Article 8(2)(b)(iv), coupled with the intent re-
quirement that the attack be directed against the natural envi-
ronment, insulates a reasonable military commander from
liability if the attack is directed against an adversary’s satellite
and is not intentionally designed to create a cascading set of
collisions through the creation of debris.
Kinetic-energy ASAT weapons likely produce “widespread”
harms under ecocentric regimes. The amount and size of debris
241 Id. at 883–84.
242 Id. at 884–85. The inclusion of the word “overall” indicates that the per-
ceived military advantage can incorporate the anticipated effects of other coordi-
nated operations. Id. at 884. The modifier “clearly excessive” narrows the scope
of collateral damage that can satisfy the elements of the crime, which comple-
ments an intentional knowledge requirement to initiate an attack for the purpose
of causing widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment. Id.
243 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 184, art. 55. It would have to be argued
that the astronauts/cosmonauts conducting human spaceflight are a population
indiscriminately affected by debris from an ASAT engagement. According to the
report of Committee III on AP I, the choice was made to eliminate any reference
to “civilian” population; the term is intended to incorporate the entire popula-
tion of an area, and the attacks prohibited could “affect the whole population
without any distinction.” See COMMENTARY OF 1977, supra note 202, at 663.
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produced by a kinetic-energy ASAT engagement depends on
many factors, including the mass of the satellite, the mass of the
kinetic interceptor, the relative velocities of the objects, and the
angle of intercept, among others.244 Previous engagements have
demonstrated that a significant portion of the resulting debris
can continue to remain in the orbital period. Arguably, the area
occupied by the debris would constitute “widespread” harm
under both the ENMOD and AP I/Article 8(2)(b)(iv)
definitions.245
The “long-term” prong of ecocentric harm regimes is also
likely satisfied. Depending on the altitude of the engagement,
debris can persist for upwards of one hundred years before de-
caying into the atmosphere,246 remaining a threat to operational
spacecraft and unintentional collisions until it reenters. Based
upon the accepted definitions for “long-term” harm, debris that
remains a collision hazard for decades exceeds the temporal
limitations suggested in ENMOD, AP I, and Article
8(2)(b)(iv).247
The final prong, “severe,” experiences the greatest disparity
across the ecocentric regimes. The ENMOD definition encom-
passes “serious or significant disruption or harm to human life,
natural and economic resources or other assets.”248 Since AP I
and Article 8(2)(b)(iv) contain no inherent definition of “se-
vere,” and AP I Article 55 indicates that “severe” is meant in an
anthropocentric manner,249 defining a purely ecocentric mean-
ing of “severe” damage outside of ENMOD’s definition is prob-
lematic. Under ENMOD, there is an argument that debris
resulting from a kinetic-energy ASAT attack could pose a severe
threat to a state’s economic assets in orbit.250 Additionally, it
could also be argued that denying the use of viable orbits, espe-
cially those in the GEO band, is a significant disruption or harm
to natural resources.251 These claims may be difficult to adjudi-
cate, as the United Nations Compensation Commission’s
244 See generally K. Sakuraba et al., Investigation and Comparison Between New Satel-
lite Impact Test Results and NASA Standard Breakup Model, 35 INT’L J. IMPACT ENGI-
NEERING 1567 (2008).
245 See ENMOD, supra note 109, art. I; Additional Protocol I, supra note 184,
art. 35; Rome Statute, supra note 216, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
246 See KELSO, supra note 67, at 329.
247 See COMMENTARY OF 1977, supra note 202, at 417.
248 Cf. id. at 417 n.177.
249 Id. at 414.
250 Cf. Sadeh, supra note 8, at 47.
251 See id.
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(UNCC) experience showed when attempting to arbitrate cate-
gory claims presented at the conclusion of the first Gulf War.252
In many instances, the UNCC panel had difficulties determining
attribution for the damages alleged, limiting or preventing resti-
tution.253 Claims resulting from debris collision in outer space
would likely face similar challenges simply because of the debris
tracking resolution of current technology.254
Thus far, ENMOD appears to be a viable regime for prevent-
ing the use of kinetic-energy weapons against satellites in orbit,
aside from the potential difficulties of attribution when bringing
forth a claim. As previously discussed, ENMOD’s elements are
disjunctive, requiring only one of the conditions to be met when
assessing liability.255 However, ENMOD Article II requires the de-
liberate manipulation of a natural process to satisfy the defini-
tional use of environmental modification technique.256 The
destruction of a satellite in orbit is arguably not a deliberate ma-
nipulation of a natural process but the destruction of an artifi-
cial object. Therefore, ENMOD likely has limited application to
kinetic-energy ASAT weapons because the use of these weapons
is not a deliberate modification of the environment.257 Indeed,
this view is espoused as a basic position by China.258
252 See Meredith DuBarry Huston, Comment, Wartime Environmental Damages:
Financing the Cleanup, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 899, 911–13 (2002). The U.N.
Security Council established the UNCC under Resolution 687 to handle compen-
sation claims “for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and
the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals,
and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Ku-
wait.” Id. at 911. F4 claims encompassed several categories of claims, including
“(e) Depletion of or damage to natural resources.” Id. at 912–13.
253 Id. at 913–14.
254 The collision of Cosmos 1934 with a fragment of Cosmos 926 occurred in
1991 but was not recognized as a collision until over a decade later. See Accidental
Collisions of Catalogued Satellites Identified, supra note 165. Space tracking technol-
ogy has significantly improved in recent decades, but this collision provides an
example of potential difficulties with attribution when the objects involved can
be as small as 2 centimeters and orbiting at altitudes hundreds or thousands of
kilometers above the Earth’s surface.
255 See Lawrence & Heller, supra note 217, at 72–73.
256 See ENMOD, supra note 109, art. II.
257 Kumar Abhijeet, Arms Control in Outer Space: ASAT Weapons, in RECENT DE-
VELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW, supra note 8, at 129, 138. Some examples given of
environmental modification techniques envisioned by the Conference include
earthquakes, tsunamis, and deliberate changes in weather patterns, so as to cause
destruction, damage, or injury to another state party. See COMMENTARY OF 1977,
supra note 202, at 415 n.103.
258 See Existing International Legal Instruments and Prevention of the
Weaponization of Outer Space, supra note 84. According to the Permanent Mis-
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On the other hand, Rome Satute Article 8(2)(b)(iv)’s ele-
ments have a conjunctive requirement; the damage to the envi-
ronment must be “widespread, long-term and severe.”259 Kinetic-
energy ASAT weapons likely produce widespread and long-term
effects under definitions recognized by the ICC through AP I.
Arguing that the weapons produce severe damage to the natural
environment is less likely to succeed, since AP I recognizes the
anthropocentric motivations behind protecting that natural en-
vironment’s ability to sustain human life.260 However, under Ar-
ticle 21(1) of the Rome Statute, the ICC shall apply:
(1) “In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence”; and
(2) “In the second place, where appropriate, applicable trea-
ties and the principles and rules of international law, in-
cluding the established principles of the international law
of armed conflict.”261
Since the Elements of Crimes does not expand upon the defini-
tions of “widespread,” “long-term,” and “severe,” one might ar-
gue that the accepted definitions under ENMOD could be
applied in order to meet the threshold necessary for a “severe”
attack.
Three issues remain when applying Article 8(2)(b)(iv) to a
kinetic-energy ASAT engagement: specific intent, proportional-
ity, and context. The Elements of Crimes for Article 8(2)(b)(iv)
requires:
The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental
death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment
and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an ex-
tent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and di-
rect overall military advantage anticipated.262
sion of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, “[t]his provision
bans only the use of environmental modification techniques in outer space, but
other means of strike, damage and injury to other States are not dealt with.” Id.
259 See Rome Statute, supra note 216, art. 8(2)(b)(iv) (emphasis added).
260 See COMMENTARY OF 1977, supra note 202, at 414.
261 Rome Statute, supra note 216, art. 21(1)(a)–(b); see Mark A. Drumbl, Wag-
ing War Against the World: The Need to Move from War Crimes to Environmental Crimes,
22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 122, 138 (1998).
262 Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Elements of Crimes, in Official Records of the
First Session, at 131–32, ICC Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002) [hereinafter Elements
of Crimes].
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This requires specific intent on the part of the perpetrator,
and the intent must be to cause widespread, long-term, and se-
vere damage to the natural environment. It is unlikely that, in
the context of an ASAT engagement, the intent of the individual
ordering the attack is to cause damage to the natural environ-
ment in orbit. Rather, it is much more plausible that the attack
is specifically directed against a critical component of an adver-
sary’s communications, navigation, or targeting infrastructure.
Perhaps the detonation of a nuclear device (a crude yet effective
ASAT weapon) in orbit with the intention to harness the EMP
effect and artificial radiation belts as destructive forces would
satisfy this element, but such an attack is governed by a multi-
tude of other regimes.263
A proportionality assessment requires that the damage to the
natural environment must also be “clearly excessive” compared
to the military advantage gained from the attack. Since there has
yet to be a case brought forth before the ICC under Article
8(b)(2)(iv), the jurisprudence on what constitutes “clearly ex-
cessive” in relation to environmental damage is undeveloped. At
present, the perpetrator must have knowledge of the dispropor-
tionate effect on the natural environment when evaluated
against the perceived military advantage gained.264 According to
the Elements of Crimes, this requires a value judgment, and the
ICC must only take into account the information available to the
individual at the time.265 The International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg considered the case of General Lothar Rendulic,
charged with “wanton destruction of property” for employing
scorched earth tactics in Poland to halt the advancing Russian
Army.266 Though the Committee on Facts and Evidence (Com-
mission I) arrived at the conclusion that there was no actual mil-
itary necessity for employing these tactics, Rendulic was
acquitted based on the necessity he perceived based upon the
263 Detonation of nuclear devices in orbit has been shown to create long-last-
ing artificial radiation belts, similar to the natural Van Allen belts, which would
continue to pose dangers to space assets for years after creation. See generally J.L.
Barth et al., Space, Atmospheric, and Terrestrial Radiation Environments, 50 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR SCI. 466, 470–72 (2003).
264 See Newton, supra note 193, at 884.
265 Elements of Crimes, supra note 262, at 131–32, 132 n.37.
266 See Bronwyn Leebaw, Scorched Earth: Environmental War Crimes and Interna-
tional Justice, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 770, 773 (2014).
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information available to him at the time.267 Therefore, it is un-
likely that the decision to employ a kinetic-energy ASAT weapon
would satisfy the requirements in the Elements of Crimes because a
military commander could reasonably believe that the destruc-
tion or disruption of an adversary’s communications, navigation,
or targeting infrastructure will not clearly result in excessive
damage to the natural environment from the resulting fragmen-
tation debris.
Finally, it should be noted that Article 8(2)(b)(iv) only ap-
plies to situations in which there is both an ongoing interna-
tional armed conflict and an individual who ordered an attack
who was aware of the factual circumstances establishing the exis-
tence of an armed conflict.268 Therefore, Article 8(2)(b)(iv)
would not constrain the testing of kinetic-energy ASAT weapons,
such as the engagements of FY-1C and Microsat-R, regardless of
any intentional or unintentional damage to the natural environ-
ment that results from these tests.
VII. REENGAGING RECIPROCITY: RESTRICTING
KINETIC-ENERGY ASAT WEAPONS
Modern warfare relies on space-based assets to leverage full
use of the systems that states currently employ. Operation De-
sert Storm demonstrated how space-based assets are a “force
multiplier” for sharing targeting information, establishing com-
munications, and guiding precision munitions.269 As this shift in
warfighting occurred, a shift in strategy to counter space assets
has also emerged. U.S. dependence on GPS and communica-
tions satellites has made C4ISR systems the new center of grav-
ity—the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything
depends.”270
267 See id. at 774; see also Nobuo Hayashi, Requirements of Military Necessity in Inter-
national Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 39,
123 n.334 (2010).
268 See Elements of Crimes, supra note 262, at 131–32.
269 See Lambeth, supra note 212, at 6–7.
270 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 595–96 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret,
eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1976) (1832). The Department of Defense
defines “center of gravity” as “[t]he source of power that provides moral or physi-
cal strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JP 1-02, DIC-
TIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 29 (2010) (as amended through
Feb. 15, 2016).
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In the event that armed conflict breaks out between two or
more states that possess contemporary, advanced militaries,271
the existing legal regimes governing outer space activity will not
prevent kinetic-energy engagements against space-based assets.
Further, state practice continues to demonstrate an ambivalence
towards operational testing of such weapons through a lack of
enforcement of OST Article IX provisions for international con-
sultations. While the current status of creating restrictions on
kinetic-energy ASAT weapons appears to be at an impasse, it is
in the international community’s best interest to find an agreea-
ble framework on restricting such weapons because of the deb-
ris they produce.272
Since the proposed PPWT has failed to gain traction because
of U.S. objections to controls on ground-based ASAT weap-
ons,273 it is time to rethink the underlying framework and work
toward a new regime that acknowledges both American and
Russian desires for BMD systems and the dangers posed by the
proliferation of space debris produced by intentional break-
ups.274 When there exists a desire to rapidly create new interna-
tional norms, expectations of reciprocity can serve as the
rationale for the emergence of new customary international
law.275
History has shown that international agreements founded
upon reciprocity are effective at regulating the means and meth-
ods states use to conduct warfare.276 Reciprocity is especially suc-
271 In this context, the author defines an advanced military as one that lever-
ages space-based assets for conducting warfighting functions (C4ISR, targeting,
etc.).
272 See generally, e.g., U.S. Letter on the Draft PPWT, supra note 125.
273 See id. at 7.
274 It is highly unlikely that any state with the capability will agree to dismantle
their existing BMD systems in furtherance of an ASAT-restriction regime. Be-
cause of the near impossibility of distinguishing kinetic energy ASAT interceptors
from BMD interceptors, any proposed framework will need to consciously ad-
dress this fact and contain provisions that allow for interceptors in BMD mode
while prohibiting kinetic engagements of space-based systems.
275 See Bruno Simma, Reciprocity, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW ¶ 3 (2008) (citing President Truman’s continental shelf declara-
tion as an example of a rapid recognition of a new international norm through
state reciprocity).
276 See Eric A. Posner, Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity, 6 L. &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 148, 150 (2012) (arguing that “reciprocity remains the logic of
the laws of war.”). See generally Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of War-
fare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65; 1868 St. Petersburg Declara-
tion Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
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cessful in areas with comparatively limited institutionalized
norms, such as corpus juris spatialis.277 For reciprocity to be suc-
cessful, both parties must receive mutual benefit from the pro-
posed limitations placed on their sovereign freedom of
action.278 In this specific context, the mutual benefits received
would be the continued access to orbits without a substantially
increased fear of damage from rogue debris and the increased
survivability of the C4ISR assets that enable warfighting.
The creation of a new reciprocity agreement would also ad-
dress the problems identified in the previously considered re-
gimes. Restricting engagements against space assets to EM,
cyber, or directed-energy methods would significantly reduce
the debris created compared to kinetic-energy attacks. The en-
suing reduction in debris could potentially negate the issue of
transboundary harms resulting from kinetic breakups and simi-
larly reduce the problem of attribution for pieces of debris too
small to persistently track with current surveillance networks.
Further, as a binding international treaty, a proposed reciprocity
agreement would preempt any assessment of the LOAC princi-
ples currently relied upon by military commanders to justify ki-
netic-energy engagements. Finally, it would significantly curb
future pollution of the natural environment by removing any
requirements of causing harm to human populations or in-
tending to modify the environment in order to assess liability.
The United States should consider entering into bilateral ne-
gotiations with either China or the Russian Federation to de-
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Matens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, re-
printed in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 53 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff
eds., 3d ed. 2000). The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II were
bilateral agreements between the United States and the U.S.S.R. that reduced the
operational number of nuclear weapons employed by both sides under a reci-
procity framework. See Interim Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.–U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 3462; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
U.S.–U.S.S.R., June 18, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 96-25 (not presented to the
Senate for ratification following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; however,
both states agreed to abide by the terms if reciprocated by the other). But see
Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,
U.S.–U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987, 1657 U.N.T.S. 2; Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, supra
note 73. While these treaties were in force for multiple decades, the United States
has withdrawn from both, citing a lack of Russian compliance with the terms.
277 See Simma, supra note 275, ¶ 1.
278 Id. at ¶ 4; see also Posner, supra note 276, at 153.
160 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
velop a workable international framework that acknowledges
the dangers of kinetic-energy interceptors while promoting
transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) that
assist in distinguishing BMD systems from ASAT weapons.279
Russia and China’s previous attempts to create an ASAT control
regime with the PPWT through PAROS facially indicate that
both countries are willing to negotiate restrictions on ASAT test-
ing and use. A retreat by either from engaging in further discus-
sions or a refusal to become a party to an agreement based upon
bilateral negotiations with the United States would expose previ-
ous proposals as insincere attempts to restrict U.S. ASAT capa-
bilities as Russia and China continue to develop their own.
A concern with reciprocity agreements is that they create a
system of “haves” and “have nots,” similar to that of the nuclear
weapon nonproliferation regimes. However, a moratorium on
kinetic-energy ASAT testing and use does not inherently impede
states from attacking or degrading an adversary’s C4ISR net-
work. Directed-energy weapons would continue to provide soft-
and hard-kill options to space assets but without exacerbating
the debris problem.280 EM jamming and scrambling can be em-
ployed to temporarily disable communication between a satellite
and the ground link—a strategy Russia and China are develop-
ing and integrating into their core warfighting functions.281 Fi-
nally, satellites and their ground-link control stations rely on
computer network connectivity to function, and they operate on
hardware and software with similar vulnerabilities that continue
to be exploited by cyberattacks.282
Of the four countries that have demonstrated a kinetic-kill ca-
pability against an orbiting object, the United States, China, and
Russia are known to be developing or refining directed-energy
279 Reciprocity-based arms control treaties can generally be treated as a pris-
oner’s dilemma problem, with additional requirement of monitoring compli-
ance. See Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law,
36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 93, 104 (2003). Without the addition of TCBMs, states will
likely be unable to distinguish BMD systems from ASAT interceptors.
280 Kaplow, supra note 91, at 1202.
281 See ROGER N. MCDERMOTT, RUSSIA’S ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES TO
2025, at 17, (2017); TATE NURKIN, CHINA’S ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS 51–52
(2018).
282 See Jan Kallberg, Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War, 6 STRATEGIC
STUD. Q. 124, 130 (2012). Satellites and their control systems may be especially
vulnerable, since their hardware is generally unable to undergo upgrade after
they are launched into space. Id. Some satellites still rely on ageing supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that have been exploited by cyber-
attacks, such as Stuxnet. See id.
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weapons and EM-jamming systems capable of affecting C4ISR
networks. The current technological high-water mark for ASAT
systems is directed-energy weapons, such as the U.S. Army’s Mid-
Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL).283 On October
17, 1997, the U.S. Army “illuminated” an orbiting Air Force sat-
ellite, only temporarily blinding it, but demonstrating that a
ground-based laser was capable of tracking and producing ef-
fects on an orbiting object.284 The MIRACL system could also be
used to perform a hard kill on spacecraft, focusing the directed-
energy beam and transferring enough energy to the craft to
physically destroy some or all of its components.285 In 2006,
China demonstrated a similar capability by blinding a U.S. satel-
lite with a ground-based laser.286 Further, Russia appears to be
developing both ground- and air-based laser systems, with a pri-
mary focus on ASAT missions.287
Additional methods recognized to negate satellites in orbit in-
clude attacking the ground-control station, jamming the com-
munications and control EM spectrum, and conducting
cyberattacks directed either at the control station or the satel-
lite’s onboard equipment. Both Russia and China are develop-
ing advanced jamming technologies aiming at disrupting
communications between satellites and ground forces, and it is
likely that other states will pursue similar technologies in an at-
283 U.S. Test-Fires ‘MIRACL’ at Satellite Reigniting ASAT Weapons Debate, ARMS
CONTROL ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_10/miracloct [https://
perma.cc/L6UP-BQND] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
284 See id. Illuminating a target means aiming a directed-energy weapon at an
object, generally with minimal power and without the intention of physically al-
tering the object. See id.
285 See Maj. Thomas A. Summers, How Is U.S. Space Power Jeopardized by an
Adversary’s Exploitation, Technological Developments, Employment and En-
gagement of Laser Antisatellite Weapons? 30 (unpublished research paper, Air
Command & Staff College, Apr. 2000), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7a79/
9cc933063ea408645a5e2c1ea07aa93cee39.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMT2-XAD3].
Ground-based directed-energy weapons are generally significantly limited in their
field of view relative to objects in LEO. See id. at 14. This problem can be over-
come by making the weapons system airborne (e.g., Airborne Laser Laboratory)
or by installing the weapon in space. Id. at 16, 41. For a thorough explanation of
laser systems applications to ASAT, see generally Summers, supra.
286 See Milowicki & Johnson-Freese, supra note 68, at 4.
287 See U.S. DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
28–29 (2019), https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20
Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RB43-JBYW]; O’Connor, supra note 33, at 2.
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tempt to counter states that rely heavily on space-based assets.288
Cyber vulnerabilities have been exploited by state and non-state
actors, and it is likely that states who do not currently possess
kinetic-kill capability can still target space assets through cyber-
space.289 Cyberattacks are capable of causing material damage to
physical hardware,290 and they can more readily be employed by
states that do not possess space launch capability.291 A proposed
framework banning kinetic-energy engagements should not dis-
suade states from refining these technologies, since the objec-
tive purpose is to reduce the proliferation of artificial debris in
orbit. A framework that does not leave states viable options for
negating an adversary’s C4ISR network will likely result in states
simply disregarding the ban when faced with active hostilities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the fifty-two years since the Outer Space Treaty established
the framework for state activity and responsibility for activities
conducted in outer space, over 22,000 pieces of trackable debris
have been created in LEO alone. The international community
has failed to enforce obligations under Article IX of the Outer
Space Treaty, and the United States missed an opportunity to
reinforce these key provisions during the USA-193 engagement.
The Liability Convention expanded upon state liability for dam-
age caused by activities in outer space, yet the Convention has
been unable to curb the creation of debris from intentional
breakups. Accepted restrictions on the means and methods of
warfare, including prohibitions on environmental modification
and attacks that result in widespread, long-term, and severe
damage to the environment—arguably a by-product of kinetic
satellite kills—have had little impact on the testing and use of
kinetic-energy anti-satellite weapons. Reciprocal agreements
prohibiting testing and first use are a potential solution for re-
ducing the proliferation of debris in orbit—especially in geosta-
tionary orbits where debris remains indefinitely. Finally, as more
nations demonstrate the ability to intercept space objects using
288 See CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE, supra note 287, at 33; O’Connor,
supra note 33.
289 See CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE, supra note 287, at 33.
290 The Stuxnet malware is an example of a cyberattack that caused physical
damage to Iranian centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facilities. See Thomas M.
Chen, Stuxnet, the Real Start of Cyber Warfare?, IEEE NETWORK, Nov.–Dec. 2010, at
2, 3.
291 See CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE, supra note 287, at 20, 28, 33.
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kinetic-energy weapons, the United States cannot allow near-
peer competitors to establish customary international law norms
that tolerate intentional breakups in orbit.
